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ABSTRACT: 
This thesis presents an analysis of the compatibility of the Human Rights Act 1998 with the 
theory of political constitutionalism. The theory envisions a constitutional order where those 
exercising political power are held to account, for the most part via the political process and 
political institutions. The thesis posits from the position of an observer of the theory that the 
Act is predominantly compatible with political constitutionalism. Nonetheless, there is scope 
for reforms which could render a future statutory bill of rights more compatible with political 
constitutionalism. The first section of the thesis examines the history of political 
constitutionalism in the United Kingdom (UK) Public Law from its descriptive origins to 
more recent attempts to construct a normative account. It argues there are actually different 
conceptions of a normative account and that these accounts might be in conflict with each 
other over certain issues, even though they are underpinned by a set of shared commitments 
about the relationship between law and politics and the proper role of political and judicial 
institutions. The rest of the thesis applies this hypothesis to the Act, analysing the Act’s
impact on the UK’s historically political constitution, the compatibility of the Act’s 
provisions and how proponents of different accounts of political constitutionalism might 
perceive these changes differently. Finally, the thesis concludes by suggesting how
proponents of different accounts of political constitutionalism might suggest different 
reforms.
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1Introduction
“We will scrap Labour's Human Rights Act and introduce a British Bill of Rights which will 
restore common sense to the application of human rights in the UK.”1
The Human Rights Act 1998 has been a divisive piece of legislation among politicians, the 
media, academics and citizens. The Act has become a battleground in the long running debates 
about the nature and content of the UK’s constitution, in particular about the place of a bill of 
rights within it. Traditionally, it was felt by many that a bill of rights was unnecessary and 
incompatible with constitutional principles. The famed constitutional scholar A.V. Dicey, for 
example, argued that liberty was safeguarded not by a bill of rights, but by the sovereignty of 
Parliament, the rule of law and common law principles.2 However, during the course of the 
twentieth century, some such as Ronald Dworkin, Lord Scarman and Lord Hailsham cast doubt
on the traditional view; they advocated that the UK should adopt a bill of rights to better 
safeguard liberties.3 This triggered a debate concerning the UK’s adoption of a bill of rights.
Today, the debate appears to have moved forward in some important respects: most notably, all 
the major political parties are committed to a bill of rights, but disagree about its contents and 
status, and of course the proper judicial role under it. Yet, at the same time, less than 20 years
since the Labour Party’s manifesto advocated the incorporation of the European Convention of 
Human Rights through the enactment of the Human Rights Act,4 the current Conservative
1 ‘The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015’ (The Conservative Party, 2015) 73
<https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto> accessed 15 April 2015.
2 A.V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of  the Constitution (9th edn, Macmillan and Co,1939) 197-204, 
A Bradley and K.D Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (16th edn, Pearson 2014) 357-358.
3 See R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977); Sir Leslie Scarman, English Law: The 
New Dimension (Stevens 1975); and Lord Hailsham, Dilemma of Democracy: Diagnosis and Prescription (Collins 
1978).
4 ‘New Labour: Because Britain Deserves Better’ (Labour Party, 1997)
<http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm> accessed 15 April 2015.
2Government seeks to replace the Human Rights Act with a ‘British Bill of Rights.’5 At the time
of writing, the Conservative Party has not made clear how their reforms will differ from the 
Human Rights Act, nor is it clear whether the current Conservative Government will be able to 
attract enough parliamentary support for its reforms given its slim majority in Parliament. With 
the future of the Human Rights Act uncertain, this is an opportune time to reflect on strengths 
and weaknesses of the Act, and in particular to consider the extent to which it is consistent with 
the dominant schools of thought over the UK’s constitutions. 
One such school of thought known as legal constitutionalism posits that the judiciary is the most 
effective institution to promote rights. Among its most notable proponents are Ronald Dworkin, 
Trevor Allan and John Laws.6 In its strongest form, legal constitutionalism argues that judicially 
enforceable higher laws found either in a bill of rights or in common law principles can best 
protect liberty. In contrast, another school of thought known as political constitutionalism argues
that democratic institutions and ordinary political activity provide more legitimate and effective 
means for the protection and promotion of rights.7 Proponents of Political Constitutionalism 
include J.A.G. Griffith. His descriptive but influential lecture ‘the Political Constitution’ inspired 
the theory.8 More recent proponents such as Adam Tomkins recognised the need to craft a 
normative theory of the political constitution and attempted to do so by incorporating 
republicanism.9 Tomkins contribution was quickly followed by Richard Bellamy, who also used 
5 ibid (n 1) 60.
6 ibid (n 3), T. R. S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (OUP 2001), J Laws, ‘The 
Constitution: Morals and Rights’ [1996] P.L. 622.
7 R Bellamy, ‘The Political Constitution and Human Rights Act’ (2011) 9 ICON 86, 91; and R Bellamy, ‘The 
democratic legitimacy of international human rights conventions: political constitutionalism and the Hirst case’ in A 
Føllesdal, J Karlsson Schaffer, G Ulfstein (eds), The legitimacy of international human rights regimes: legal, 
political and philosophical perspectives (CUP 2015) 251.
8 J.A.G. Griffith, 'The Political Constitution' (1979) 42 MLR 1.
9 A Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart 2005) 38-40.
3republicanism to produce a normative theory.10 Legal and political constitutionalism are
frequently seen as in competition with each other.11 This thesis concentrates on political 
constitutionalism. It examines whether the Human Rights Act is compatible with political 
constitutionalism. 
Examining whether the Human Rights Act is compatible with political constitutionalism is 
important for several reasons. The most significant reason is that the impact of the Act on the 
constitution has arguably made the existence of political constitutionalism more important for 
helping us understand developments in the British constitution. Most notably, and if counter-
intuitively, the Act appears to have triggered renewed interest in political constitutionalism. The 
Act is in part responsible for the attempts by different proponents to craft a normative theory of 
the political constitution.12 Insofar as they saw the Act as potentially hastening the constitution’s 
evolution towards something more like the model of the legal constitution, proponents sought to 
make clear what exactly is at stake by departing from the political constitution. They did so by 
clarifying the norms that, in their view, make the political constitution attractive. In doing so, this 
normative turn, shows how political constitutionalists believe the constitution should develop in 
the future. Analysing the compatibility the Act with these normative theories might help to cast a 
new light on our understanding of political constitutionalism. It might, for example, help us to
determine whether there is a unity of thought or disagreement among proponents about the 
current Act and what changes may be desired out of its replacement. Further reasons to examine 
this issue include, firstly, that political constitutionalists are often presented as sceptical of the 
10 R Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (CUP 2007)
11 G Gee and G C.N. Webber, 'What Is a Political Constitution?' (2010) 30 OJLS 273, 276.
12 See most recently M Goldoni and C McCorkindale (eds) ‘Special Issue—Political Constitutions’ (2013) 14 
German Law Journal 2103-2292. 
4Human Rights Act. As Gavin Phillipson recently claimed, there is a fashionable narrative from 
some political constitutionalists that the Human Rights Act is “a doubtful enterprise made worse 
by the courts’ over use of their powers” under the Act.13 Secondly, the Human Rights Act is said 
to mark a “fundamental re-structuring of our political constitution” or, at least, to supply further 
proof that the UK is slowly evolving from a political into a legal constitution.14 Finally, some 
claim the Act is significant because it seeks “to reconcile and balance the rival claims [of legal 
constitutionalism on the one hand and political constitutionalism on the other], to create a middle 
ground between them rather than adopt a wholesale transfer from one pole to the other.”15 The 
Human Rights Act creates an approach to the protection of rights that seeks to involve both 
political and legal actors in the promotion and protection of these rights.
As an observer rather than an advocate of the theory of political constitutionalism, I believe that 
the Human Rights Act can be compatible with the core claims made by political 
constitutionalists. Although it might dilute the theory’s relevance, it does not mark its demise. I 
will argue that although there might be scope for reform, many aspects of the Human Rights Act 
actually improve political institutions by creating scope for them to engage in rights protection, 
which in turn partially vindicates political constitutionalist’s faith in those institutions. In all of 
this, one goal of this thesis is to highlight how a future bill of rights could be made compatible 
with the political constitution. A second goal is to shed new light on political constitutionalism
by examining its relationship with the Human Rights Act. This can help our understanding of 
how political constitutionalists are likely to perceive future reforms which are likely to have very 
13 G Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, Dialogue and Constitutional Principles’ in R Masterman, I Leigh (eds), The 
United Kingdom's Statutory Bill of Rights, Constitutional and Comparative Perspectives (OUP for the British 
Academy 2013) 32.
14 K.D Ewing, 'The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy' (1999) 62 MLR 79, 79, ibid (n 8) 273.
15 S Gardbaum, 'The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism' (2001) 49 A.J.C.L. 707, 709.
5real implications for the ecosystem in which ordinary political activity operates. This thesis will 
engage in interpretative constitutional theory which combines descriptive and normative 
accounts of constitutionalism.16 The normative element here refers to political constitutionalism. 
The descriptive account refers the existing situation regarding the Human Rights Act. This is 
appropriate for this question as one can use the descriptive account of the current situation and 
compare it similarities and differences with an idealized account of constitution as found in the 
normative accounts of political constitutionalism to analyse and evaluate the compatibility of the 
Human Rights Act with political constitutionalism.
From the outset, I wish to make clear that two core assumptions upon which my argument is 
predicated. First, I will adopt the view held by political constitutionalist that, viewed through a
historical lens, the UK’s constitution has been predominantly political as opposed to legal due in 
large part to its emphasis on Parliamentary Sovereignty.17 There are of course different views 
within constitutional scholarship regarding the nature of the UK constitution.18 However, the
purpose of this thesis is not to question the validity of this claim. Rather, it suffices for these 
purposes to accept that there was a important sense in which the UK’s constitution has a distinct 
political character, even whilst recognizing that there was still an important role for the courts 
within it. Secondly, as a party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),19 I will 
also assume that the UK Government has and continues to respect its treaty obligations under 
international law. Although the Convention has domestic constitutional implications for the UK, 
it is also a treaty under international law. With any treaty under International Law, a signatory 
16 See N Barber, The Constitutional State (OUP 2010) 1-16.
17 D Nicol, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Politicians’ (2006) 24 LS 451, 454- 455.
18 See T.R.S Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, And Common Law (OUP 2013).
19 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR).
6state must respect the terms of the treaty as long as it remains party to it. If the UK no longer 
wishes to respect its treaty obligations, it must leave. Leaving any treaty can have serious 
political consequences, both domestic and international. The Conservatives have refused to rule 
out leaving the ECHR, but this seems unlikely to occur.20 Therefore, as the UK is a party to the 
ECHR, it should respect its international obligation. I will not analyse the compatibility of the 
ECHR regime with political constitutionalism, as this would raise questions about the 
relationship between Political Constitutionalism and international law.
In chapter one, I begin by examining what is meant by “political constitutionalism”, charting its 
origins to more recent developments by Adam Tomkins and Richard Bellamy.21 Although, other 
academics have contributed to recent development of political constitutionalism, Tomkins and 
Bellamy’s work represents the most explicit attempt to present a normative theory and in doing 
have invoked of the language of political constitutionalism more so than any other proponents.22
I will also suggest that there are different accounts of political constitutionalism, which are 
distinguished by different if overlapping focuses which in turn lead to somewhat different 
interpretations of political theories and practices. There are, as I see it, two main accounts of 
political constitutionalism: what I term “limiting” and “enabling” political constitutionalism. The 
limiting account emphasizes the vital importance of limiting the power of the executive and 
holding it to account through the ordinary political process in order to protect liberties. In 
contrast, the enabling account views the governing majority as directly accountable to the 
electorate based on its ability to successfully deliver the policies on which it was elected. Thus it 
20 N Watt ‘Cameron refuses to rule out leaving European convention on human rights’ The Guardian (London, 3 
June 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/jun/03/cameron-refuses-to-rule-out-leaving-european-
convention-on-human-rights> accessed 3 June 2015.
21 ibid (n 9), ibid (n 10).
22 Other advocates of political constitutionalism include Keith Ewing, Conor Gearty and Danny Nicol.
7emphasises the need to avoid obstacles which would disable the majority’s ability to deliver 
polices. Towards the end of chapter one, I suggest that these accounts might be in conflict with 
each other over certain issues, even though they are underpinned by a set of shared commitments 
about the relationship between law and politics and the proper role of political and judicial 
institutions. In chapter two, I briefly discuss the origins of the Human Rights Act before setting 
out how it operates. I focus on how the Act engages both political and legal actors over various
institutional stages of rights consideration. Chapter three will analyse post-legislative review by 
the judiciary, reflecting on how this tallies with the norms of political constitutionalism. In doing 
so, I point to possible tensions between the different accounts over them. Chapter four takes a 
similar approach to chapter three, in regards to democratic forms of pre- and post- legislative 
review. I conclude by arguing the Human Rights Act is compatible with political 
constitutionalism in several respects, before considering possible reforms to enhance the Act and 
reflect, in the final analysis, on whether a future bill of rights is likely to cohere with the political 
constitution. 
81.
Political Constitutionalism
In order to analyse the compatibility of the Human Rights Act with political 
constitutionalism, it is necessary first to define what is meant by “political constitutionalism.”
This chapter will establish a framework for understanding political constitutionalism. This 
will be achieved by analysing the most prominent proponent’s accounts of it. This will begin 
with its origins in UK Public law, starting with the descriptive account presented by J.A.G.
Griffith, followed by the more recent revival of the theory. Although several writers played 
an important role in influencing the revival, the focus here will be on the attempts by Adam 
Tomkins and Richard Bellamy to craft a normative account of political constitutionalism. In 
the final section of this chapter, I will suggest that today there are two dominant but different 
accounts of political constitutionalism, which I will identify as the “enabling” and “limiting”
accounts. I will suggest that despite a common commitment to the idea of a political 
constitution, there is scope for disagreement between proponents of these two accounts.
1. Descriptive account of J.A.G. Griffith’s ‘The Political Constitution’
Griffith’s lecture on ‘The Political Constitution’ serves as a starting point for understanding 
political constitutionalism.1 Despite the title, the phrase “political constitution” is not used 
during the lecture itself.2 The exact reason why Griffith did not choose to use the phrase is 
unknown, although one may suggest he may "never conceived of it as anything distinct or 
separate from the British constitution itself.”3 Another possible reason could be that Griffith’s 
focus was on presenting a counter argument rather than presenting an account of political 
constitutionalism. Griffith sought to rebut calls by the leading politicians, judges and 
1 J.A.G. Griffith, 'The Political Constitution' (1979) 42 MLR 1.
2 K.D. Ewing, 'The Resilience of the Political Constitution' (2013) 14 German Law Journal 2111, 2114.
3 G Gee and G C.N. Webber, ‘What is a Political Constitution?’ (2010) 30 O.J.L.S. 273, 277.
9academics like Ronald Dworkin, Lord Scarman and Lord Hailsham for the UK to adopt what 
one might call various interpretations of legal constitutionalism.4 Proponents of legal 
constitutionalism emphasise that a constitution protects individual autonomy, dignity, respect, 
equality and security.5 To legal constitutionalists, these values are not best protected by the 
temporary majority of the legislature.6 Instead, they suggest that at worst ordinary politics 
pose a threat to these values, or at best it is unable to effectively defend them from an 
aggressive executive.7 As a result, legal constitutionalists may envisage a constitution in 
which “politics [is] under the constraints of legal order.”8 Griffith criticism of these views is 
reflected throughout much of “the political constitution” and from this the basic foundations
of political constitutionalism were laid.9 There are two hallmarks of his argument: the 
recognition of disagreement, and the management of disagreement. 
a) Reasonable Disagreement
Political constitutionalism recognises that disagreement stems from the reality of human 
nature, which in turn shapes society and politics. Griffith observed that society was facing 
“considerable disagreement about the controversial issues of the day.”10 Individuals have 
claims, desires, interests and rights that they want to achieve in life. They are social creatures,
“[they] seek a life lived with others.”11 However, these two factors are not always compatible 
with one another. They range from disagreements over what is the best colour, to more 
4 See R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977); Sir Leslie Scarman, English Law: 
The New Dimension (Stevens 1975); and Lord Hailsham, Dilemma of Democracy: Diagnosis and 
Prescription (Collins 1978).
5 See J Laws, ‘The Constitution: Morals and Rights’ [1996] P.L. 622, 623; and D Oliver, ‘The Underlying 
Values of Public and Private law’ in M Taggart (ed) The Province of Administrative Law (Hart 1997); and 
T. R. S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (OUP 2001) 62-87.
6 T. R. S. Allan, ‘Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism’ (1985) 44 
C.L.J 111, 116.
7 T Poole, ‘Back to the future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism’ (2003) 23 O.J.L.S 
435, 449; and D Oliver, 'Democracy, Parliament and constitutional watchdogs’ [2002] P.L. 553-555.
8 D Dyzenhaus, ‘The Difference Law Makes’ (1997) 60 MLR 866, 870.
9 ibid (n 3) 277.
10 ibid (n 1) 12.
11 M Goldoni and C McCorkindale, ‘Why we (still) need a revolution’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 2197, 
2198.
10
complex disagreements such as welfare cuts, whether flag burning is a form of expression or 
whether a celebrity’s privacy should be treated with the same respect as ordinary citizens.12
Interactions with others only serve to multiply the differences and disagreements.13 These 
disagreements are continuous and wide in scope. They are ever evolving and changing as 
new variables come into play, as a result of changes in society. Thus, disagreement is 
inescapable and an unavoidable part of modern society.14 Griffith argued that at the heart of 
modern society there is conflict.15 Even today, one might argue Griffith’s point about 
disagreements remains true; there is still disagreement about the controversial issues of the 
day. 
For Griffith, conflict was unavoidable and undeniable.16 It was unrealistic to attempt to 
eliminate disagreement altogether; instead “a more realistic aim is the effective management 
of conflict.”17 Society does not wish to be in constant conflict; it seeks to find solutions to at 
least some of the disagreements it faces. This is what Jeremy Waldron has called the 
‘circumstances of politics’: where there is “a felt need among the members of a certain group 
for a common framework, decision or course of action on some matter, even in the face of 
disagreement about what that framework, decision or action should be.”18 It is through this 
that some political constitutionalists recognise there are potentially positive qualities that 
come from reasonable disagreement. It can be a catalyst for change and progress in society. 
For example, Graham Gee suggests that we should see some disagreements as a healthy and 
productive for society. Disagreements can result in “discussion, dialogue, debate, 
12 R Bellamy, ‘Constitutive Citizenship versus Constitutional Rights, Republican Reflection on the EU Charter 
and the Human Rights Act’ in T Campbell, K.D Ewing, A Tomkins (eds) Sceptical Essays on Human Rights
(OUP 2001) 15.
13 ibid (n 11) 2198.
14 G Gee, ‘The Political Constitutionalism of JAG Griffith’ (2008) 28 L.S. 20, 25.
15 ibid (n 1) 2.
16 ibid (n 14) 24.
17 ibid (n 14) 25-26.
18 J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP 1999) 102. 
11
deliberation, negotiation and bargaining… to aid in identifying new ways of thinking about 
and possibly resolving society’s conflicts.”19 Rather than being “a sinister product of self-
interest,” disagreement can spur society to progress.20 Therefore, disagreement needs to be 
limited but must not be, and cannot be, eliminated from political life.21 Managing 
disagreement is a more practical method, one which presents a process which preserves the 
positive qualities of disagreement, creative debate and progression.
b) Managing Disagreement
Griffith’s recognition of disagreement manifested itself in several ways in ‘The Political 
Constitution’. First, Griffith’s understanding of rights can be distinguished from the legal 
constitutionalism view of rights. Under legal constitutionalism, there are said to be 
fundamental values or rights that lie outside the realm of politics, on the grounds these “rights 
are recognized as being evident on the basis of reason or as natural rights, their content 
should not be left to the bargaining that typically characterizes political decision-making.” 22
Rights can be seen as trumps ensuring “a collective good is not sufficient for imposing some 
loss or injury upon” an individual.23 These ‘trumps’ act as a higher law to “ensure the rules 
are equitable and protect those vital interests without which humans would lack the capacity” 
for autonomy.24 In contrast, Griffith presents a different view of rights. In his view overriding 
human rights do not exist, instead of rights there are actually “political claims by 
individuals.”25 What we describe as our ‘inherent rights’ are merely the expressions of claims 
we believe should be recognised in general or in a specific context.26 By ourselves or with a 
19 ibid (n 14) 26.
20 ibid (n 11) 16.
21 M Goldoni, 'Two internal critiques of political constitutionalism' (2012) 10 ICON 926, 930.
22 ibid 930.
23 Dworkin ibid (n 3) XI. 
24 R Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (CUP 
2007) 17-18. 
25 ibid (n 1) 17.
26 ibid (n 1) 17.
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group of likeminded individuals, we can seek to have our claim recognised. Therefore, the 
significance of Griffith argument is that he presents an alternative view which cast doubt on 
the existing arguments about rights. He has observed that despite how rights are presented by 
proponents of a bill of rights, a claim to a right is no greater than a claim to anything else.
Secondly, the process of having claims recognised is a continuous struggle of reasonable 
disagreement which is “political throughout.”27 Griffith described politics as the management 
of disagreement; it is the “continuance or resolution of those conflicts.”28 Law is a form of 
politics in that it “is one means, one process, by which those conflicts are continued or may 
be temporarily resolved.”29 In this, “law is neither separate from nor superior to politics, but 
rather a sophisticated form of political discourse.”30
For this reason, Griffith was critical of bills of rights, in particular the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) which his opponents advocated. Griffith took issue with the 
generalised nature of ECHR rights. Most bills of rights are drafted in an abstract way in order 
to promote broad agreement at a high level of generality, but as a result they leave “the 
resolution of disputed claims of rights to a later day.”31 Consequently, Griffith maintained 
that the rights found in the ECHR were political disagreements masquerading as a resolution 
to said conflicts rather a real solution.32 In this sense, the convention’s rights are unlikely to 
unite opinion; rather, they serve to divide opinion (or at least to highlight the divisions that 
already exist in society at large).33 Thus, for Griffith, bills of rights do not resolve or even 
decrease social disagreement.34
27 ibid (n 1) 17.
28 ibid (n 1) 20.
29 ibid (n 1) 20. 
30 ibid (n 3) 277.
31 G C.N. Webber, ‘Rights and the rule of law in the balance’ (2013) 129 L.Q.R. 399, 400-402. 
32 ibid (n 1) 14. 
33 ibid (n 1) 20.
34 T Poole, ‘Tilting at Windmills? Truth and Illusion in ‘The Political Constitution’' (2007) 70 MLR 250, 258.
13
However, Griffith’s principal concern was that placing these rights in a judicially enforceable 
bill of rights would ultimately places political decision of these social disagreements in the 
hands of judges instead of politicians.35 Managing disagreement through a court would not 
make those decisions any less political because “law is not and cannot be a substitute for 
politics.”36 To present questions of politics and economics as questions of law would lead to 
the real issues being evaded, to questions of legal interpretations.37 Instead politicians should 
make these decisions.38 By this, Griffith is not suggesting with enthusiasm that political 
actors will do a better job; Griffith accepted the idea that politicians are no more likely to 
come up with the right answer. However, unlike the judiciary, political actors are more likely 
to be held to account and are ultimately dismissible at elections.39 Accordingly, the 
incorporation of the ECHR would have undesirable consequences such as disagreements 
would end up in the hands of lawyers who will engage in the “exercise of interpreting woolly 
principles and even woollier exceptions.”40 A process of democratic decision making was 
viewed as a more legitimate mechanism for the promotion of rights.41 Once again, Griffith 
questions the arguments presented by the advocates of bill of rights.
Griffith’s critique of the ECHR and the term “rights” has sometimes led to political 
constitutionalism being misrepresented as rights sceptic. It would be more accurate to suggest 
that although Griffith himself was sceptical of rights, most political constitutionalists are 
better described as sceptical merely of the mechanisms used to uphold rights such as a 
35 ibid (n 1) 16.
36 ibid (n 1) 16. 
37 ibid (n 1) 17.
38 ibid (n 1) 16.
39 ibid (n 1) 18.
40 ibid (n 1) 14.
41 R Bellamy, ‘The democratic legitimacy of international human rights conventions: political constitutionalism 
and the Hirst case’ in A Føllesdal, J Karlsson Schaffer, G Ulfstein (eds) The Legitimacy of International Human 
Rights Regimes: Legal, Political and Philosophical Perspectives (CUP 2015) 251.
14
justiciable bills of rights.42 Many contemporary political constitutionalists describe 
themselves and others as being committed civil libertarians.43 Griffith himself was arguably a 
rights sceptic, but for our purposes what is important is that his arguments highlight that 
rights give rise to disagreement. This does not deny rights can exist under a political 
constitution, as long as it is understood that rights themselves give rise to disagreement rather 
than being unquestionable truths. Rights are not susceptible to a singular, “correct” 
interpretation but rather to a range of reasonable interpretations.44 Therefore, the best method 
to “interpret and implement rights is to leave the determination of their content to the political 
process.”45 Political actors may confer legal “rights” via statutes to ensure individuals or 
minority’s claims receive protection or are promoted. However, said laws must be drafted by 
democratically legitimate institutions “as precise as possible and not open to abuse” to 
prevent extensive re-interpretation by less legitimate institutions such as the courts.46 Thus as 
Bellamy claims under political constitutionalism “the specialness of rights can be indicated 
by the special way they are treated by politicians” instead of the way they are handled by 
judges.47
Finally, Griffith’s stated “politics is what happens in the continuance or resolution of those 
conflicts. And law is one means, one process, by which those conflicts are continued or may 
be temporarily resolved.”48 This is the recognition that the management of disagreement must 
reflect the temporal nature of disagreement. Society is an ever changing organism. In turn,
disagreements and their solutions must also change. As a consequence of this, disagreements 
42 R Bellamy, ‘UCL Lunch hour lectures: Do We Need a British Bill of Rights and a Written Constitution?’ 
(UCL, London 13 November 2008)  <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lhl/lhlpub2/10_131108> accessed 11 December 
2014.
43 A Tomkins, 'The Role of the Courts in the Political Constitution' (2010) 60 UTLJ 1, 3.
44 D Nicol, ‘Professor Tomkins' House of Mavericks’ [2006] P.L. 467, 470.
45 ibid (n 21) 931.
46 J.A.G. Griffith, 'The Common Law and the Political Constitution' (2001) 117 L.Q.R 42, 61.
47 ibid (n 41) 252-253.
48 ibid (n 1) 20.
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may have temporary solutions, wrong solutions or- in rarest circumstances- have permanent
solutions. Accordingly, political constitutionalism recognises the resolutions of conflicts are 
at best temporary in nature.49 As later writers have stated in “pluralist societies, the range of 
core values held by individuals is so wide that almost any proposed reason is likely to conflict 
with that of someone else,” it is plausible to assume disagreement will also increase over 
time.50 Throughout time disagreements will continue as societies’ views change. For 
example, in the UK society once felt that the death penalty was a suitable form of punishment 
for the most serious crimes, but by 1965 society felt it was no longer the right solution due to 
several miscarriages of justice.51 Yet recent polling suggests 50% of citizens want the death 
penalty reinstated.52 Society may reinstate the death penalty; after a few years, it may also 
decide it was an error to bring it back and therefore seek to repeal it again. Any process for 
managing disagreement must accommodate the evolving nature of disagreement.  
2. Republicanism and the Normative Political Constitution
Griffith’s account has been criticised as being merely descriptive.53 It is hard to determine if 
he intended to establish a normative account or provide a descriptive account of the British 
constitution as it was in 1979.54 This descriptiveness is problematic, as modern constitutional 
developments have been said to move the UK constitution towards a legal constitution.55 As a 
consequence, political constitutionalism was overlooked by many who believed it was never 
grounded in any particular norms or values.56 A second generation of political 
constitutionalists spearheaded by Adam Tomkins and Richard Bellamy have sought to rebut 
49 ibid (n 1) 20; ibid (n 14) 20. 
50 ibid (n 24) 164.
51 Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965.
52 W Dahlgreen, '50 years on, Capital punishment still favoured' (YouGov.co.uk, 13/08/2014) 
<https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/08/13/capital-punishment-50-years-favoured/> accessed 10 November 2014.
53 D Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom (OUP 2003) 20.
54 Although some have cast doubt on whether Griffith’s account was really descriptive. See ibid (n 3) 277; ibid 
(n 14) 20-45; ibid (n 34) 250-277. 
55 ibid (n 3) 273-274.
56 A Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart 2005) 40. 
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this, developing instead a normative model of the political constitution. They saw Griffith’s
arguments as providing “a fresh and provocative way of thinking and talking about the 
British constitution,”57 but requiring the injection of a normative grounding. A normative 
model of political constitutionalism seeks to render explicit the normative qualities of day-to-
day politics (what its proponents regard as) the normatively attractive qualities of day-to-day 
politics which can help to secure constitutional goods such as the rule of law, human rights 
and political equality. The second generation sought to show this by drawing on norms of 
republican political theory. Both Tomkins and Bellamy claim that republicanism undergirds 
political constitutionalism.58 The following section discusses the values of republicanism that 
both Tomkins and Bellamy emphasise in their work: popular sovereignty and freedom by 
non-domination. 
a) Popular Sovereignty and Non-Domination
The first norm is popular sovereignty which requires that the source of power starts at the 
bottom of a state with the citizens, as opposed to the top. When power is filtered down from 
the top, it is often ill-defined, unaccountable and left in the hands of those at the top of the 
state such as with the government or a monarchy. For example, Tomkins highlights the 
distinction between the US and UK’s Constitution. The US Constitution states that any power 
not specifically stated in the constitution rests with the states and the people.59 In contrast, in 
the UK, any power not expressed by Parliament remains with the Crown under the Royal 
Prerogative.60 This power does not come from an accountable source of authority, thus open 
to abuse by those at the top. The second norm is freedom by non-domination which means 
57 ibid (n 3) 277.
58 However, more recently Goldoni and McCorkindale have questioned this claim: see M Goldoni, C 
McCorkindale, ‘A Note from the Editors: The State of the Political Constitution’ (2013) 14 German Law 
Journal 2103, 2104.
59 The Constitution of the United States of America, Article V.
60 ibid (n 56) 58.
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“we are not free if we are subject to another who dominates us.”61 It can be distinguished 
from the liberal theory of freedom from interferences. Under freedom from interference, a 
person is free as long they are not interfered with by those in power.62 However, 
republicanism argues that under a dictatorship one could be deemed free under the liberal 
interpretation, as long as the regime does not interfere with their interests. They are not free, 
as long as those in power can still practice interference at will and with impunity, without 
seeking permission or being subject to any punishment for such an action.63 It is not restraint 
that makes us unfree; it is the possibility of unaccountable power dominating us. In this 
regard, republicanism appears to recognise the reality of the modern state: we need 
government, and we need some restraint and interference.64 Non-domination requires that 
when citizens are to be interfered with, the action is taken by a person with the legitimate 
authority to do so. This, in turn leads to how the government does not exercise power to 
damage the rights of the people. Here Philip Pettit’s answer is that not only should legitimate 
authority be a question of the consent of the people, but also be subject to a requirement for 
“contestability by the people of everything the government does.”65 Thus, an elected 
legislator gains legitimacy through elections and only holds power on trust of citizens.66
b) Promoting Non-Domination
To promote non-domination, Tomkins and Bellamy emphasise the following values; open 
government, civic virtue and political equality.67 Open government and civic virtue allows
citizens to be able to contest the decision of the executive and the legislator. Open 
government is a requirement that aims to ensure that political decisions are in the public 
61 ibid (n 56) 47.
62 See I Berlin, Liberty: Incorporating 'Four Essays on Liberty' (H Hardy ed, OUP 2002).  
63 P Pettit, Republicanism: a Theory of Freedom and Government (Clarendon Press 1997) 22.
64 H S. Richardson, Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the end of policy (OUP 2002) 24.
65 ibid (n 63) 277.
66 A Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’ (2002) 22 O.J.L.S. 157, 174.
67 Tomkins, ibid (n 56) 61-65, Bellamy ibid (n 24) 145-175.
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interest over particular groups.68 As citizens, we need to be able to see and understand what 
their elected government is doing in order to contest them. Therefore, freedom of expression 
to criticise government is pointless without freedom of information to help us feed and 
articulate our grievances.69 Nevertheless, open government serves little purpose if citizens are 
apathetic towards political activity.70 According to Tomkins, republicanism emphasises civic 
virtue. Tomkins argues citizens need to be interested in what is the common or public good
and thus, they need a strong sense of “public spiritedness.”71 This aims to foster a sense of 
collective spirit rather than individualism. As a bi-product of this, it will help aid government
and Parliament to track and act in the common good. Citizens should not be apathetic; they 
should want to actively engage in the political process.72 In turn, civic virtue implies that a 
collective community should be vigilant to the actions of the government as apathy grants 
them more discretion.  However, what is meant by the common good is ill-defined and 
idealistic. Tomkins uses “the right to clear air” as an example of a common good.73 In 
contrast, others claim the common good is an ideological interpretation.74
The final element is political equality. Domination can occur if there is inequality between 
citizens. This may be material inequality; money can dominate when the wealthy are able to 
influence public affairs more than the poor.75 Political constitutionalism advocates political 
equality. If “non-domination only operates where everyone has equal status” then the 
decision making process should reflect this.76 Political equality requires a process where 
68 ibid (n 56) 61.
69 ibid (n 56) 62.
70 ibid (n 56) 62.
71 ibid (n 56) 62.
72 ibid (n 56) 63. 
73 ibid (n 56) 63.
74 ibid (n 44) 468.
75 ibid (n 24) 162.
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every citizen has “the equal chance to have one’s voice heard.”77 Only through this can 
citizens “enjoy a non-dominating environment that treats them with equal concern and 
respect.”78 Equal voting operates on two levels: on one level it applies to citizens in general 
elections and on another level it applies to institutions.79 Consider this in the context of 
citizens at a general election: by giving each and every citizen just one vote, we can ensure 
that all citizens views carry equal weight in the decision making process.80 No matter their 
wealth, position, gender, race or other distinguishing trait, all citizens are equal when 
engaging in the political process by voting. At an institutional level, each representative of 
legislature will have an equal say when voting on a decision. Their race, wealth, intelligence, 
popularity, political career and consistency location will not lead to them having an unfair 
weight behind their vote than any other representative.
In this respect, majority rule is perceived to be the fair process for reaching an outcome. 81
Majority rule ensures a process which does not favor the content of the views.  It is neutral in
that winners cannot claim victory on the grounds that their judgment is superior to their 
opponents; their success merely reflects their view was endorsed by the majority of the 
political community.82 Furthermore, majority rule gives equal respect to individuals. Both 
Bellamy and Waldron approve of majority rule because it is input-related, as opposed to 
output reasoning.83 Majority rule is neutral in terms of process; it does not favor a particular 
outcome, therefore no one view needs to be played down or hushed up in the name of 
reaching a preferred outcome.84 Secondly, the inputs of millions of individuals are all 
77 ibid (n 21) 932.
78 ibid (n 24) 221. 
79 ibid (n 21) 932.
80 ibid (n 24) 223.
81 ibid (n 24) 225-226. 
82 ibid (n 24) 226. 
83 ibid (n 24) 145.
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weighted equally; the weight will be minimal because of the large numbers involved, and 
those in the minority may feel they carry no weight at all. However, these are necessary to 
ensure fairness.85 Therefore, because of the achievement of reaching the decision in this way 
it is said decisions warrant respect.86 Through equal voting and majority rule when
governments issue law, they have authority “not because people agree or give their consent to 
them, but because they have had a fair say in the process that led to the adoption of the 
law.”87 To ignore this would cause domination, as it would “not respect citizens as people 
capable of political judgment on fundamental questions such as the content of rights.”88
Political constitutionalists argue that the parliamentary model can ensure in terms of 
institutional design the principle of political equality.
Political equality also entails a rejection of constitutional entrenchment.89 To entrench certain 
values or procedures in a constitution would act as a source of domination by taking issues 
out of the public discussion and freezing them in some constitutional document.”90 The 
problem is the content of the constitution will give rise to disagreement. We have seen 
disagreement will never cease because the ever changing circumstances will continuously 
affect people’s opinions. Entrenchment can limit future political action without providing a 
solid justification.91 It gives the views of those who believe something should be entrenched 
more weight than everyone else. Thus, the values of previous generations of citizens are 
entrenched producing domination over future generations who may disagree with their 
ancestor’s judgments. As a consequence, “any constraint or limit imposed by legal 
85 ibid (n 18) 108-114; ibid (n 24) 226.
86 ibid (n 18) 108.
87 ibid (n 21) 933.
88 ibid (n 21) 931.
89 However, Goldoni has recently taken issue with this. See M Goldoni, 'Political Constitutionalism and the 
Question of Constitutional-Making' (2014) 27 Ratio Juris 387-408.
90 M Goldoni, ‘Constitutional Reasoning According to Political Constitutionalism: Comment on Richard 
Bellamy’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 1053, 1072.
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instruments [might] appear as illegitimate and arbitrary over the following generations.”92
The solution instead is to view the constitution not as a fixed point, but instead as something 
which “lives on, changing from day to day for the constitution is no more and no less than 
what happens.”93 Bellamy argues the constitution must be left open so we may rebuild the 
ship at sea – employing, as we must, the prevailing procedures to renew and reform those 
self-same procedures.94 By this, Bellamy argues that “the democratic process is the 
constitution.”95 Since the process of political equality through voting and majority rule 
provides a neutral system which treats everyone with equal concern and respect, it is the only 
process for determining the content of a constitution. Through the ordinary political process,
the constitution must be “forever subject to challenge, revision, amendment and conceivable 
rejection.”96 In this sense, all politics are constitutional and contestable.97
As a consequence of this, political constitutionalism appears to invite a degree of ambiguity 
over its prescriptive content.98 As Gee and Webber have observed, the political model 
envisaged by Tomkins and Bellamy prescribes “no more than the bare minimal conditions for 
political equality and accountability and non-domination.”99 Therefore, they suggest by 
design the model “leaves it to political actors, operating through the ordinary political 
process, to prescribe the nature and content of the constitution.”100
92 ibid (n 21) 936.
93 ibid (n 1) 19.
94 ibid (n 24) 172.
95 ibid (n 24) 5. 
96 ibid (n 3) 283. 
97 ibid (n 21) 934. 
98 ibid (n 3) 286-290.
99 ibid (n 3) 287.
100 ibid (n 3) 287. 
22
3. Two Political Constitutions
As I see it, there are two dominant accounts of political constitutionalism. The accounts that I 
set out below are highly stylized, and necessarily exaggerate some themes—but they do so in 
a way that helps to highlight importance differences of emphasis between proponents of 
political constitutionalism. As we shall see, despite the many similarities in their 
constitutional thought. I see both Richard Bellamy and Adam Tomkins as each offering 
slightly different accounts of political constitutionalism, which in turn are emblematic of two 
dominant strands within political constitutionalist thought. That there should be more or less 
distinct streams of thought within political constitutionalism is perhaps unsurprising. After 
all, the vision of the constitution outlined in Griffith’s work, together with the nature and 
content of republicanism and ordinary political activity, are all open to interpretation. As a 
consequence, proponents envisage the values of political constitutionalism being achieved in 
somewhat different ways. Given all that unites the work of political constitutionalists (e.g. the 
shared belief in the primacy of political institutions, a commitment to parliamentary 
sovereignty, and an opposition to an expansive judicial role oriented around a justiciable bill 
of rights), it might seem mean-spirited to emphasize the distinctions between them.  But, as I 
hope to show, there are subtle yet significant differences between proponents of political 
constitutionalism. I argue that these differences reflect variations in how political 
constitutionalists perceive key facets of everyday political activity. I will use Tomkins and 
Bellamy’s works as representative of two schools of thought. The former is representative of 
what I shall identify as “limiting political constitutionalism,” the latter is representative of 
“enabling political constitutionalism.” Griffith’s work influences both. Thus Griffith cannot 
be as easily categorised as he displays elements of both accounts in “the political 
constitution.” Furthermore, some proponents of political constitutionalism might oscillate 
between the two accounts, depending on the focus of their argument. Finally, I point to 
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evidence of an internal tension between the two accounts, based on a debate over the role of 
political parties, which helps to highlight some of the subtle differences between these two 
accounts.
a) Limiting Political Constitutionalism
The limiting account of political constitutionalism focuses on ensuring the executive is 
subject to effective and democratic control by the legislature to protect the common good. 101
For sure, this is a concern for all political constitutionalists. But the special emphasis placed 
on the need to limit government is a feature of what I term the “limiting” account of political 
constitutionalism. Those who subscribe to this account of political constitutionalism stress 
that the government’s power and freedom must be limited by Parliament to ensure it does not 
act in its own or a privileged minority’s interest against the common good. In the UK, the 
Governments power is limited by the requirement that it needs to maintain the support of the 
elected House of Commons. According to Tomkins, the success of the UK’s Constitution 
results from “a simple and beautiful rule” that the government of the day may only hold 
power if it continues to have the support of the majority of the House of Commons.102
Therefore, the executive is constitutionally accountable to a democratic legislature. This 
account seeks to weaken the power of government and strengthen the power of democratic 
legislatures.
The limiting account is sceptical of government, believing that it is unable to self-regulate in 
a wholly effective way.103 Tomkins argues that we need to recognise what he describes as the 
101 ibid (n 56) 3.
102 ibid (n 56) 1.
103 ibid (n 56) 31.
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‘reality of government.’ This is the idea that “those in political office are liable to try to do 
whatever they think they can get away with.”104 Similarly, other proponents (e.g. Keith 
Ewing) have argued in the past the government has used the vagueness and flexibility of the 
constitution for their own ends, resulting in freedoms being unnecessarily limited.105 Some 
have criticized the rapid growth of the power of the office of Prime Minister and the Cabinet 
office, alongside a failure to update the structure of executive accountability to reflect this.106
They claim governments are prone to overreacting in the face of a crisis, taking actions “with 
insufficient regard to the repression that might result, causing disproportionate and 
unnecessary rights violations.”107 Governments are criticised for having a reluctant attitude to 
reforming themselves.108 There is also some evidence suggesting that citizens’ trust in 
government has fallen since the millennium.109 For these reasons, proponents of limiting 
political constitutionalism argue that the government cannot be trusted to act as a benevolent 
ruler for the common good at all times. Therefore, institutional protection is needed to ensure 
the government’s powers are limited to guarantee they act in the common good, rather than 
their own desires.110
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105 K.D Ewing and C.A Gearty, Freedom under Thatcher: Civil Liberties in Modern Britain (Clarendon Press 
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Tomkins believes that the purpose of all constitutions is to find ways of insisting that a 
government is held to account for its actions.111 However, instead of legal controls as 
advocated by legal constitutionalism, the limiting account advocates the “holding of those 
who exercise political power to account, for the most part, through political processes and in 
political institutions.”112 These are primarily achieved through existing ordinary political 
activity. For example, the doctrine of responsible government means all the members of the 
government are subject, individually and collectively to Parliament for their actions, policies 
and decisions.113 The Members of Parliament (MP’s) role is to hold the government to 
account.114 In turn, MPs are accountable directly to their citizens in their constituency at 
elections.115 Therefore, both the government and Parliament are politically accountable for 
their decisions to citizens.116
Since under this interpretation of constitution the government is accountable to the 
Parliament, Tomkins claims “we should abandon the notion that Parliament is principally a 
legislator, we should instead see Parliament as a scrutineer, or regulator of government.”117
This is because, in practice, Parliament does not make many laws; instead, the government as 
executive makes the overwhelming majority of bills, which are then placed before Parliament 
for approval to become law. Additionally, the power of Parliament comes from its power to 
refuse to enact laws, although the power is rarely exercised. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that 
Parliament defeating government legislation is not the norm.118 Instead, Parliament has 
111 ibid (n 56) 2.
112 ibid (n 3) 273.
113 ibid (n 106) 37-38.
114 A Tomkins, ‘Professor Tomkins' House of Mavericks: a reply’ [2007] P.L. 33, 33.
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powerful legislative influence. Through the use of committees, amendments and day to day 
negotiations, the government must engage with Parliament to ensure it has sufficient 
parliamentary support on its bills, and it is in this way that the Commons (and the Lords) can 
protect the common good by curtailing the worst excesses of government.119 Thus, the 
limiting account views Parliament as a democratic institution for scrutinising the government.
By design, Parliament is effectively the best institution to ensure deliberative, contestatory 
democracy that produces reasonable and proportionate laws.120
In applying republican norms, Tomkins argues that where government acts unaccountably (as 
in avoiding acting without the majority support of Parliament), it is not merely wrong; it is 
unconstitutional.121 Government acting unaccountably is incompatible with for proponents of 
limiting political constitutionalism, as it would be to act in a way which is incompatible with 
the republican norms of popular sovereignty and non-domination.122 Tomkins considers the 
use of the royal prerogative as being incompatible with his account. For example, the 
Thatcher government used the Royal Prerogative instead of statute to grant the Home 
Secretary emergency powers. These included the power to authorise the Home Office to 
supply CS gas and plastic baton rounds to a chief constable for operational use by the police, 
even where the local police authority had refused to approve the supply of such equipment.123
In the case of ex parte Northumbria Police Authority, the court held that the government was 
able to rely on the royal prerogative of keeping the peace to authorise such decisions.124
Tomkins argues that the judgment and the use of any prerogative powers without 
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Parliamentary consent are unconstitutional under this account.125 To be compatible with the 
norm of popular sovereignty and non-domination, the government should only possess power 
which the people, through their elected representatives in Parliament have conferred on them. 
The executives powers must be completely “constructed out of and… constrained by the 
law.”126 Only Parliament can grant the government the power it seeks by producing a statute.
Since under the UK doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty no Parliament can bind a future 
Parliament, said statute will remain contestable, thus ensuring through political accountability 
the republican norms of popular sovereignty and non-domination are achievable. To keep an 
effective check on the government, legislation should be the government’s only source of 
power as it is a product of a politically accountable process.127
Similarly, it would be unconstitutional for the courts to engage in political questions. 
Tomkins, like Griffith before him, makes clear the role of the courts should be to resolve 
legal disputes and not to take the role of political actors by attempting to resolve political 
disputes because they are unaccountable. Since the judiciary is not elected, neither is it 
responsible to any elected body.  The courts lack popular sovereignty as a source of their 
power to make political decisions. They also could be a source of domination as they are not 
politically accountable, when compared to legislature.128 Therefore, the courts should refrain 
from engaging in political questions since transferring responsibility for determining such 
political questions from a political realm to the judicial realm is objectionable when viewed 
from a republican standpoint.129 It is for Parliament, as the scrutiniser of governmental power, 
to ensure the executive legislation is proportional and reasonable during legislative 
125 ibid (n 56) 60, 132.
126 ibid (n 44) 7.
127 ibid (n 44) 8.
128 ibid (n 56) 25.
129 ibid (n 56) 26, 60.
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proceedings. Proponents of limiting political constitutionalism view “Parliaments [as] the 
true guardians of liberty” against the excesses of government.130
Nevertheless, the limiting account recognises the courts have a role to play in holding the 
government to account. The courts in some circumstances may play a vital role in ensuring 
political accountability of the government.  Firstly, the limiting account recognises that the 
courts are vital to “ensure that government acts within the scope of its legal powers and that 
the protection of civil liberties should be privileged.”131 The limiting account envisages “the 
courts’ attitude should be assertive and not deferential toward the executive power.”132 Many 
limiting political constitutionalists have criticised the courts for giving too much deference to 
the government in matters of national security.133 The courts must ensure that the government 
acts only within (and not beyond) its statutory powers, strictly construed.134 Secondly, the 
courts should have the responsibility to alert Parliament when the government acts in a 
manner that undercuts or circumvents effective parliamentary scrutiny.135 For example, 
Tomkins envisages a system where, when faced with doubts about the proper scope or 
meaning of a government power, the courts could refer the matter back to Parliament, who 
can then provide a clear final view on the matter.136 Thus, limiting political constitutionalism 
envisages a system where by both the legislature and judiciary can work together to provide 
an effective check on the executive. Under this system, Parliament should only confer power 
on the government after serious consideration which can be achieved through ordinary 
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parliamentary scrutiny and debate. When Parliament does confer a statutory power on 
Government, it must take great care to ensure the exact extent of the power being confirmed 
is made clear by the words of the statute. The courts, in turn, must not be deferential to 
Government and enforce Parliaments will do its best to ensure the government does not 
exceed its power. 137
b) Enabling Political Constitutionalism
The enabling account of political constitutionalism focuses on facilitating the successful 
delivery of policy goals by the governing majority. This is because the government’s policy 
goals are seen to have the support of the citizens who voted for the political party that 
commands a majority in the House of Commons. This account places special emphasis on the 
capacity of electoral competition to incentivise political parties to represent the beliefs of the 
people and are “able to galvanize popular support around even controversial and socially 
transformative legislation.”138 Furthermore, they believe that the government should not be 
subject to constitutional obstacles in the delivery of policy, as this will either result in 
domination or the distortion of effective political accountability to the citizens.139
Constitutional obstacle can take both legal and political forms. For example, constitutional 
review by the courts or filibustering might be considered constitutional obstacles. There are 
two elements to this account. First, the ordinary political process modelled on (although not 
exclusively on) the UK Parliament promotes a culture of “incentivisation” which results in 
effective accountability and progressive democratic legislation. Secondly, the rejection of 
constitutional obstacles to the delivery of policy goals such as entrenched laws and judicial 
strike down powers.
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The enabling account draws on existing political activity such as competing political 
parties,140 although, its interpretation of it is different from the limiting account. In particular, 
the enabling account emphasises the importance of voting in periodic elections, the need to 
secure a majority to govern and a balance of power between competing political parties.  The 
enabling accounts emphasises that citizens should vote directly for a political party to gain or 
remain in power. Firstly, competing political parties are viewed as “the engine of the 
democratic process and the mirror that reflects the citizens’ critical judgment.”141 Secondly, 
the act of voting for a party is more like expressing a judgement of the common good.142
Thus, the common good viewed as ideological concept with different political parties 
presenting their conception of the common good according to their ideology. The balance of 
power here represents the republican view of dividing power in such as a way which ensures 
ensuring decision makers have to ‘hear the other side.’143 Together, these create what could 
be called a ‘culture of incentivisation’ in political institutions which promotes political parties 
to ‘hear the other side’ and build winning electoral coalitions.144 This is believed to create a 
system which can facilitate the idea of creative working compromises in the face of 
reasonable disagreement and incentivise progressiveness. First, the division of power will 
facilitate “rival aspirants for power” who will take the form of competing parties.145 Second, 
under a system of majority, rival parties will need to recruit the support of the largest 
majority of the citizens to either gain power or remain in office.146 This incentivises parties to 
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seek to represent the widest workable range of views to construct a broad election winning 
campaign.147
The progressiveness of this approach is that in order to attain and stay in government, parties 
will continuously need to recruit and retain quite a divisive range of support.148 Rather than 
focus on a single or narrow range of issues, the most successful party “needs to involve a 
broad collection of ideals and interests,” as “too narrow a focus will restrict its appeal and 
limit its chances of winning support.”149 Parties must continuously seek to broaden their 
appeal to citizens, to ensure that they represent more citizens than their opponents. For this to 
be workable, parties need to act as a vehicle for “people sharing similar visions for society to 
come together to pursue common aspirations.”150 For example, consider that the Conservative 
party, who might include a broad coalition of views such as social, fiscal, and progressive 
forms of conservatism. The continuous need to recruit voters will mean that parties must also 
look beyond their own ideologies and update with society in order secure or maintain a 
majority.  Parties may adopt policies from their rivals which are popular. As a result, parties 
frequently end up “stealing their opponent’s clothes and even conceding that in certain areas 
[their opponents] do indeed have the better policies.”151 If a party is unwilling to change with 
society, it runs the risk of losing voters and ground in the debate to more progressive rivals.152
Additionally, a culture of incentivisation encourages parties to be tolerant and sympathetic 
towards less numerically strong groups within society. The balance of power and majority
rule means that parties are unlikely to attempt to particularly discriminate against selective 
147 G Gee, ‘Is there more to the Political Constitution than meets the eye?’ (Political vs. Legal Constitutionalism: 
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groups or act against the interest of the voters, as this will lose support for the party to 
another political party. 
Once a political party has secured the support of a majority, it must also deliver on its 
promises. Here, the culture of incentivisation works to prompts the successful delivery of 
policy goals by the government. The failure to deliver those policies means that the 
governing party may lose office. For example, a party promises to introduce legislation that 
would create a universal health care system. The governing party has promised to deliver this 
policy during its 4 year term in office. Should they fail to do as, they should be held to 
account at the next election by citizens. Therefore, the act of voting also serves to pass 
judgment on the performance of the government. This may not always be case, as each 
individual voter will give different weight to each policy. However, if a majority of voters 
were to see failure to deliver as significant, the governing party may lose office to another 
party.  Yet, this form of accountability “requires the governing party to be given a reasonable 
term to carry out its policies without constitutional obstacles which would provide it with an 
alibi for failing to deliver.”153 By constitutional obstacles or hurdles, the enabling account 
refers to measures which stop the governing party carrying it out its policies such as 
legislative veto’s, entrenched laws and constitutional strike down powers by the courts. These 
should not act as obstacles to the government in successful implementation of policies which 
have the support of the majority. These obstacles would have a distorting effect on the direct 
accountability of the government. Furthermore, these constitutional obstacles are seen as a 
way of maintaining the status quo.154
153 ibid (n 121) 284. 
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The enabling account sees entrenched laws as a potential attempt to lock-in elites, who fear
the possibility that in the near future they may be overturned.155 Although, some constitutions 
entrench laws in order to create counter majority checks, Bellamy has argued that “counter-
majoritarian checks unfairly favour the status quo, potentially entrenching the unjust 
privileges of historically powerful minorities, but it also offers no incentives for those 
running these different branches to be responsive to citizens.”156 For example, “the 
constitutions of many democracies have excluded significant categories of people from 
citizenship, notably women and those without property, and placed severe limits on the 
exercise of the popular will.157 Furthermore, the enabling account see the constitutional 
review by the courts as another constitutional obstacle. They argue “constitutional courts 
have a tendency to consolidate the status quo.”158 The judiciary is representative of a small 
white, wealthy and well educated minority within society,159 and because “the judiciary 
simply are part of the ruling class,” they have an interest in preserving the status quo and in 
the past have used their power to do so.160 Enabling political constitutionalists point to cases 
such as Dred Scott v Sandford where the US Supreme Court supported slavery,161 or Hammer 
v Dagenhart where the US Supreme Court deemed laws outlawing child labour as 
unconstitutional.162 Judicial review of constitutional laws is perceived as re-enforcing the 
status quo or acting as a way of oppression.163 In order to avoid domination, there must be no 
bias towards the status quo.164 Therefore there should be no constitutional obstacles to stop 
the government delivering its policy goals. 
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Proponents of the enabling account frequently highlight what are regarded as progressive 
policies that result out of the culture of incentivisation as evidence to support their claims. 
For example, Bellamy has highlighted legislative changes which have given “greater numbers 
of people more of a say, either by enfranchising previously excluded groups or through the 
devolution of power to sub-units.”165 It might also be used to repeal previously oppressive 
legislation and judicial judgments. For example, the Representation of the People Act granted 
universal suffrage.166 As Bellamy comments, “[m]ost progressive democratic reforms have 
been made with the support of existing voters acting to undermine their own privileged 
position.”167 Legislation can be progressive by repealing laws which are no longer acceptable 
to the majority such as the de-criminalisation of homosexuality.168 Furthermore, both 
Bellamy and Waldron have commented that the political process can lead to richer and more 
respectful debates. Waldron has argued, that “it is sometimes liberating to be able to discuss 
issues like abortion directly, on the principles that ought to be engaged, rather than having to 
scramble around constructing those principles out of scraps of some sacred text, in a 
tendentious exercise of constitutional calligraphy.”169 Elsewhere, Danny Nicol has argued the 
ordinary process has given us “the NHS and the Welfare state, aspects of British life which 
have liberated many more of us than any fundamental rights instrument ever will.”170
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166 Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act 1928.
167 ibid (n 24) 225.
168 Sexual Offences Act 1967.
169 ibid (n 18) 290–291.
170 ibid (n 121) 280.
35
c) Tensions between the Limiting and Enabling Accounts of Political 
Constitutionalism
One must concede that both accounts present highly stylised visions of political 
constitutionalism. They are each designed to supply “an explanatory framework within which 
to make sense of a real world constitution.”171 Despite the overlap between the two, there is 
also scope for disagreement between each other.  The difference between the two is one of 
emphasis. Ordinary political activity is open to interpretation; for example, “law is either an 
instrument for implementing political decisions or a constraint on political action.”172 How 
one evaluates the current system and responds to reforms may differ and in turn may give rise 
to disagreement. In this section I want to illustrate this point by suggesting that proponents of 
the limiting and enabling accounts of political constitutionalism might differently view the 
role of political parties. Tomkins (as a limiting political constitutionalist) and Nicol (as an 
enabling political constitutionalist) have disagreed about the role of parties. I will now 
evaluate this debate between the two and consider what this tells us about the two different 
accounts of political constitutionalism.
Tomkins has suggested some potential reforms to the British constitution to further conform 
to his model.173 One of his proposed reforms is to ensure that both houses of Parliament 
operate freely from constraints caused by party loyalty. Tomkins argues that party is the 
biggest hurdle to effective executive accountability. Instead of holding the government to 
account in the name of the common good, backbench MP’s become “loyal to their political 
parties. If their political party is one which happens to be in government, the logic of party 
loyalty dictates that they support the governments regardless of the greater common good. 
Conversely, if their political party is in opposition MP’s can seek to obstruct government 
policy for the sake of political point scoring even where the government is acting in the 
171 ibid (n 3) 291. 
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[common good].”174 Tomkins suggests the only way to secure a system where by Parliament 
seeks to represent the common good and hold the executive to account is to prohibit party 
whips. Thus, “there should be no institutional means- save for seeking to justify the merits of 
their policy in open parliamentary debate—by which the government is able to secure 
parliamentary support.”175
Nicol, adopting an enabling account rejects Tomkins arguments. He views party as vital to 
political constitutionalism. Nicol suggests “most MP’s vote for the party line not because 
anyone is forcing them but because they agree [with it].” They are voting with the coalition 
of people with whom they have more in common than their rivals.176 Party ideology serves as 
an expression of one conception of a common good; thus, there is good reason for MP’s to 
vote with their party. Additionally, the role of the parliamentary whip is to coordinate willing 
support to pass a bill, rather than bullying MPs to vote with the party. Therefore, government 
whips help enable the successful delivery of policy. Furthermore, he believes removing 
parties will damage accountability. Nicol concedes that MP’s must keep the government in
line through the back bench pressure or potential rebellions. However, he believes incumbent 
MPs should use the promises the party was elected on to act as a barometer to which 
government policy can be judged. Party ideology can help members of the incumbent party 
secure concessions or keep the government in line with values they were elected on.177
Removing ideology would not benefit parliamentary debates either, as it would result in a 
situation where MPs “would be concealing their ideologies under the cloak of objective 
neutrality as to the common good” as judges are often accused of doing.178 Thus, removing 
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parties would end up severing “the fundamental cord of accountability that links the British 
government to the electorate.”179
This disagreement highlights the subtle distinctions between the two accounts on multiple 
axes. The first distinction is how the executive is viewed. In the limiting account, the 
executive is viewed negatively. The proponents of the limiting account lack faith in the 
government. They believe that those that hold powers will struggle to resist the “desire to 
dominate.”180 Hence why are they are perceived as being liable to try to get with whatever 
they can political get away with. If the limiting account is correct, then “we can never aspire 
to decent government.”181 In contrast, the enabling account adopts a different view. They 
recognise the government is capable of restricting liberty and acting against the common 
good; they also recognise it is equally capable of making progressive policy and acting in the 
common good. Nicol has criticized Tomkins for his narrow view of the executive. Instead, 
“any analysis [of the executive] should encompass the role of government in extending 
liberty and well-being, as well as its role in restricting liberty.”182 The crux for the enabling 
account is that the constitution ensures that the government performs positively. As a 
consequence, both accounts view accountability differently. To the limiting account, 
accountability focuses on the prevention of the government acting against the common good. 
The enabling account is about incentivising the government to act in the common good at all 
times.
This is a crucial distinction between the two, resulting in both accounts presenting different 
answers to whom and how accountability should be achieved. For the limiting account, the 
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government is accountable to the House of Commons, who are representatives of the citizens. 
This is why Parliament is described as the “guardian of liberties” under this account; 
Parliament must protect the interests of citizens from the excesses of the government. As a 
consequence, similarly to how “the independence of the judiciary is a constitutional essential 
in legal systems that seek to rely on the courts to play the lead role in attempting to hold the 
government to account, so too is the independence of Parliament essential in the British 
context.”183 Thus, “Parliament desperately needs MPs who, while they may belong to 
political parties, can nevertheless see beyond the limited horizons of short-term party 
advantage … and who can understand that it is by working together that those on the 
backbenches can have the most influence over, and can most effectively scrutinize, those in
office.”184 This form of accountability works more effectively where the House of Commons 
is stronger and government is weaker.185 The government may be weaker because of a tiny 
majority or because MP’s are more willing to challenge the government; for example, 
Tomkins cites the Commons ability to challenge the Blair government in the early 2000’s as 
evidence of the Commons ability even when the government have a large majority.186 A 
stronger Parliament means more opportunity for parliamentary debate.
However, this form of approach to accountability can be criticised on two grounds. First, this 
form of accountability promotes a narrow form of deliberation known as “elite deliberation,” 
where by a “manageably small body of representatives... can deliberate about the 
[appropriateness of measures].”187 By placing faith in the House of Commons, only 650 MPs 
are allowed to contribute to this form of deliberation; thus, the electorate could be relegated 
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to being an observer of the deliberation until the next election. As Nicol critiques, “an elite of 
650 is better than a Downing Street cabal, but not much better.”188 Secondly, in favouring a 
strong House of Commons, this approach could result in risk aversion by the government. If 
the government is fearful of the short term political consequences that might arise from 
Parliament, they may be more inclined to introduce more conservative policies rather than 
radical policies. However, radical policies may be needed to enable progressive social goods. 
Thus, Nicol has criticised this form of accountability as being “better at stopping proposals 
than in advancing them. As a blueprint for governance it is essentially reactionary because it 
privileges the status quo.”189 Although progressive polices could occur, it may be the case 
that they are incremental.
The enabling account seeks to “foster a different kind of accountability which emphasises the 
positive delivery of policy goals.”190 The government is accountable to the electorate, rather 
than the Commons. Accountability is about what the electorate believes the government 
should do, rather than the Commons. Under this account, rather than restricting the process, 
the parties play a vital role in assisting the government deliver its goals. The enabling 
accounts views that the “pursuit of the “common good” is a transparently ideological one.”191
The external conflict between rivalling political parties and the internal conflicts within 
parties represent “the conflicts inherent in society.”192 Parties becomes an important factor 
within Parliament in ensuring the government is held to account. The party provides the 
terms of which to hold the government to account and the authority to do so. If the 
government is elected on pledges to increase funding to education or not privatising the 
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National Health Service but decides to do the opposite within the Commons, MP’s can rebel 
when the leadership attempts to veer away from the policies they were elected on.193
Furthermore, with terms given to them by the electorate, MPs can hold significant influence 
in ensuring the government delivers its policies. This form of accountability is thus less about 
stopping policy, but more about enabling it to occur. Thus, “party democracy does not 
sidestep the main issue: rather, it prioritises capture of the executive as the very focus of 
political activity.”194 Thus, the limiting account desires to remove parties who would produce 
problems. Without parties, the governing majority would be without reasonable terms to 
carry out its policies. Rebellious MPs would provide the government with an excuse for 
failing to deliver its promises to the electorate.195 Without party, the citizens would have no 
say over the policies of government. Party serves as a link between the government and the 
citizens.196 Thus, under this account the “emphasis would be placed not on MPs checking the 
executive but on democratised parties constituting the executive.”197
This account favours strong governments over strong Parliaments. According to Tom Ellis, 
strong government can be defined in either a narrow sense or a wider sense. The narrow 
sense focuses on short term goals; the wider sense focuses on the long term goals.198 There is 
scope to see the enabling account desiring strong government in both contexts. For example, 
it is clear that there is a focus on the achievement of the short term interests of the elected 
political party. However, one can also infer a long term interest as the enabling account 
appears to believe while there might be differences between the political parties about details, 
there remains a common held and continuous belief that “the point of government has 
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become to initiate legislation in the cause of social progress.”199 In contrast, the limiting 
account dislikes strong government. Tomkins has described it as “a vision (beloved of the 
right and of the “old” left alike) of strong government in which Parliament is little more than 
the obedient vehicle through which the government legislates, and in which elections are 
turned into false referendums on the government in which the overwhelming majority of the 
electorate is denied a relevant vote, members of the government representing only a small 
minority of parliamentary seats.”200 Furthermore, Marco Goldoni has suggested because the 
time gap between elections gives “representatives a period of time during which they become 
isolated and independent from the citizenry… elected officials may become a sort of political 
clergy.”201 In sum, the simple but significant point that bears emphasis is that those who 
advocate limiting and enabling accounts of political constitutionalism can hold more or less 
distinct views about important aspects of everyday political life such as political parties. The 
question that will be pursued later on in this thesis is whether proponents of the political and 
limiting accounts have different views about and reactions to the Human Rights Act.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to provide an overview of political constitutionalism from the 
historical descriptive account through to the modern republican-inspired accounts. The main 
message conveyed in this chapter is that there are different interpretations of political 
constitutionalism. The enabling accounts focuses on strong government, the successful 
delivery of policy and the direct accountability of government to the electorate over the 
delivery of these policies. In contrast, the limiting account focuses on deliberative democracy 
in the commons, the protection of common goods, and the accountability of the government 
to Parliament and Parliament to the people. As a result, political parties are viewed positively 
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by the enabling, but negatively by the limiting account. What this demonstrates is the scope 
for disagreement within political constitutionalism. A new generation of political 
constitutionalists such as Marco Goldoni and Christopher McCorkindale have begun 
engaging in a reflective analysis of political constitutionalism.202 This thesis will not focus on 
their works directly for two reasons.  Firstly, the nature of their work is engaging in a similar 
approach as this thesis is; a reflective analysis of political constitutionalism. There work 
seeks to cast light on the nature of political constitutionalism by studying recent writing on it. 
As a result, they do not seek to advance the substantive core claims of political 
constitutionalism per se. Therefore, they are not directly engaging in a critique of the scope of 
judicial review or seeking to defend the workings of parliamentary accountability. As such, 
their work--although vitally important in helping us understand political constitutionalism yet 
it is not directly relevant to this thesis's exploration of the Human Rights Act. Secondly, due 
to their reflective focus, they have not touched directly on the Human Rights Act as 
extensively as other proponents of political constitutionalism. This thesis will be analysing 
the compatibility of the Human Rights Act with political constitutionalism; I will suggest 
possible implication of it for the enabling and limiting accounts. Given that elements of 
ordinary political practice can be interpreted differently, it remains probable that the Human 
Rights Act also gives rise to these forms of disagreements. Therefore potentially allowing 
greater reflection of political constitutionalism’s understanding of ordinary political activity 
and how proponents can exchange in debates about a bill of rights. 
202 See M Goldoni and C McCorkindale (eds), ‘Special Issue—Political Constitutions’ (2013) 14 German Law 
Journal 2103-2292.
43
2.
The Human Rights Act
This chapter focuses on the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the institutional 
model of rights protection it instituted.  The first section of this chapter recaps on the reasons for 
the Act’s creation and the concerns that influenced the framers of the Act. The second section
explains how the Human Rights Act creates an institutional model of rights protection which 
involves both political and legal institutions in a mix of pre- and post-legislative review over
various stages. All of this is necessary (and admittedly mostly descriptive) background for the 
analysis undertaken later in this chapter where I identify and reflect on the issues that the Act’s 
model of rights protection raises for the “limiting” and “enabling” understandings of political 
constitutionalism identified in the first chapter.
1) The Road to Incorporation
J.A.G. Griffith’s vision of a constitution organised around the ideals of political debate, 
participation and accountability provided a foundation for the theory of political 
constitutionalism that developed into an important school of thought in the UK over the last 40 
years. Yet, despite this, Griffith’s critique against calls to incorporate the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic law were unsuccessful.1 Both domestic and 
International pressure encouraged the creation of the Human Rights Act. 
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR).
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a) Domestic Pressure
Calls during the 1970s for reforms to the way that rights were protected in the UK suggested that 
some were growing concerned about a developing crisis of “over governability in which 
executive proposals quickly became law, via a quiescent Parliament without sufficient 
consultation, scrutiny or debate and without any possibility of subsequent judicial challenge.”2
During the 1980s concerns intensified. For many, such as Keith Ewing and Conor Gearty, faith 
in the constitution came under serious challenge from a Prime Minister who was willing to use 
the vagueness and flexibility of the constitution to her own ends.3 The Thatcher government
“merely utilized to the full the scope for untrammelled power latent in British constitution but 
obscured by the hesitancy and scruples of previous consensus-based political leaders.”4 As a 
consequence, the Thatcher government “acquired a reputation for authoritarianism and disregard 
of traditional checks and balances.”5 The opposition parties were unable in Parliament, nor in the 
1983, 1987 and 1992 general elections, to substantively weaken the Conservative government. 
During this period several private members tried to introduce a bill of rights. Although these 
attempts failed due Government opposing them, they do provide useful insight into the tensions 
about adopting a bill of rights in 1980s and 1990s. In 1987, Sir Edward Gardener introduced a
Private Member Bill called Human Rights Bill.6 Although there was some cross bench support in 
the commons, the bill failed to get enough support.7 Some members welcomed the bill 
expressing concerns about the growing power of the executive and potential for it act in an 
2 K.D Ewing and C.A Gearty, Freedom under Thatcher (Clarendon Press 1990) 6.
3 ibid 7.
4 ibid 7.
5 D Erdos, 'Ideology, Power Orientation and Policy Drag: Explaining the Elite Politics of Britain's Bill of Rights 
Debate' (2009) 44 Government and Opposition 20, 32.
6 Sir Edward Gardner (Conservative) HC Deb 06 February 1987 vol 109 col 1223.
7 ibid col 1223- 89.
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authoritarian way.8 However, a range of arguments where raised against the bill. Some argued it 
would undermine parliamentary sovereignty,9 or the risk of pollicisation of the judiciary.10 Some 
even suggested that it might lead to reduced parliamentary scrutiny insofar as it might encourage 
future parliamentarians to become less diligent when scrutinising legislation.11 Lord Lester of 
Herne Hill also tried to use two separate private members bills to incorporate the convention 
during the mid-1990s. The first in 1994 was fashioned on the European Union model.12 The 
second in 1996 was fashioned on the New Zealand one. 13 It was clear from these attempts that 
Government support for a statutory bill of rights would be needed if one was ever to be adopted.
By 1997 the major opposition parties—the larger Labour party and the smaller Liberal Democrat 
party—had both pledged in their manifestos to incorporate the ECHR into domestic law.14 In 
contrast, the Conservative party after being in power for 18 years remained the only major party 
to argue against incorporation. Their manifesto argued incorporation would ‘risk transferring 
power away from Parliament to legal courts - undermining the democratic supremacy of 
Parliament as representatives of the people,” with the Party concluding that such reforms were 
inappropriate for the UK.15 Support for a bill of rights and the ECHR was a long held policy for 
the Liberal Democrats, but it represented a change for the Labour Party. The party had 
8 ibid Geoffrey Rippon (Conservative) col 1243-44.
9 ibid Fred Silvester (Conservative) col 1257-1258, William Cash (Conservative) col 1286-87.
10 ibid The Solicitor-General Sir Patrick Mayhew (Conservative) col 1267.
11 ibid Andrew F Bennett (Labour) col 1258-1259.
12 Lord Lester of Herne Hill (Liberal Democrat) HL Deb 25 January 1995 vol 560 cc1136-74.
13 Lord Lester of Herne Hill (Liberal Democrat) HL Deb 05 February 1997 vol 577 cc1725-58.
14 See ‘New Labour: Because Britain Deserves Better’ (Labour Party 1997) 
<http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm>; and ‘Make The Difference: The Liberal Democrat 
Manifesto 1997’ (The Liberal Democrats 1997) <http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/e97/man/ld97man.htm> 
both accessed 15 April 2015. 
15 See ‘You Can Only Be Sure With The Conservatives: The Conservative Manifesto 1997’ (The Conservative Party 
1997) <http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/con97.htm> accessed 15 April 2015.
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traditionally being against a bill of rights. However, as David Erdos suggests, by experiencing “a 
long period out of power as a result of the Conservatives’ winning an unprecedented four general 
elections. [The] experience gradually eroded the executive-minded power-hoarding mentality 
that had generally been central to Labour’s thinking as a party of government.”16 The 
Conservative party lost office to Labour following the 1997 General Election. Within the same 
year, the Labour government published ‘Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill’ which 
set out its plans for the Human Rights Act.17
b) International Pressure
The UK’s continuing relationship with the ECHR also played a significant part. The Convention 
is a treaty, and under international law treaties are contracts between the governments of two or 
more sovereign states.18 The UK ratified the Convention in 1952 and in 1966 it allowed the right 
of individual petition to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).19 Therefore, well before 
Griffith’s criticisms, the UK was under an international obligation to observe the Convention and 
its protocols. 20 Individual petition to ECHR was problematic in practice for the citizens. First, 
public authorities were not required as a matter of domestic law to comply with the Convention. 
Second, citizens could not invoke the ECHR as an independent cause of action in domestic 
law.21 Finally, as a result of Article 35 (1) of the Convention, the ECtHR “may only deal with the 
matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted.”22 Rights Brought Home highlights 
some perceived problems of this system. It was predicted that the average citizen would have 
16 ibid (n 5) 31.
17 Home Office ‘Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill’ Cm 3782 (1997).
18 J H Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418, 476-477.
19 M Elliot and R Thomas, Public Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 698.
20 H Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (3rd edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2002) 118.
21 ibid (n 19) 698.
22 ECHR Article 35.
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spent “on average five years to get an action to ECtHR once all domestic remedies had been 
exhausted; and it would cost an average of £30,000.”23 As a consequence, these were substantial 
hurdles, unless the individual was part of a small but wealthy group of claimants24 or a powerful 
media outlet.25 The UK also had a growing number of cases being brought before the ECtHR. 
Ewing suggests that past governments had effectively “created a climate whereby incorporation 
in domestic law became inevitable.”26 One of the purposes of the Human Rights Act was to 
reduce these hurdles for the individual by providing domestic mechanisms.  
2) The Human Rights Act
The Act makes it “unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right”27 and allows convention rights to have effect in domestic law.28 As David
Feldman observes, the Human Rights Act “merely provides the machinery by which domestic 
courts and public authorities give effect to them.29 Accordingly, the Human Rights Act does not 
by design produce a “home-grown bill of rights”30 but rather provides a system for allowing the 
direct challenge of legislation, actions and decision of public authorities through the domestic 
courts. The Act does not give effect to the entirety of the Convention. Inter-state obligations have 
been omitted.31 Section 1 of the Act states that the Convention rights that it gives effect to are; 
Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention, Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol and Article 1 of 
23 ibid (n 17) para 1.14.
24 Al-Fayed v United Kingdom (1994) 18 E.H.R.R. 393, Saunders v United Kingdom (1994) 18 E.H.R.R. CD23.
25 The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979–80) 2 EHRR 245.
26 K.D. Ewing, ‘The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy’ (1999) 62 MLR 79, 84.
27 Human Rights Act 1998 s.6 (1).
28 ibid (n 17) para 2.1.
29 D Feldman ‘The Human Rights Act and the interaction of legal orders’ in M Elliot, R Thomas, Public Law (2nd 
edn, OUP 2014) 740.
30 J.L Hiebert, ‘Governing under the Human Rights Act: The Limitations of Wishful Thinking’ [2012] P.L. 27, 27.
31 Lord Boston of Faversham, HL Deb 18 November 1997, vol 583 col 467.
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the Thirteenth Protocol.32 Convention rights can be categorised as absolute, limited and 
qualified.  Qualified rights feature a limitation clause. The limitation clause allows a 
legislature’s infringement or violation of a right to be ‘saved’ or ‘defended’ in the circumstances 
set by the Convention.33 The clause sets out that the “interference with the rights will be lawful if 
the interference is (1) prescribed by law, (2) necessary in a democratic society, and (3) in order 
to protect a certain, listed, public interest—such as national security.”34 These rights include 
freedoms such as privacy and expression.35 Additionally, due to the abstract nature of the 
Convention rights, the actual text of the Convention is meaningless without the jurisprudence.36
Section 2 of the Act requires courts and tribunals determining questions which have arisen in 
connection with a Convention right to take into account the Strasbourg jurisprudence. This 
suggests the Strasbourg jurisprudence should be viewed as a floor rather than a ceiling for rights 
standards, with the UK providing its own “distinctively British contribution to the development 
of the jurisprudence of human rights in Europe.”37 This is an ambitious goal which ultimately 
depends on the standards adopted by political and legal actors.
A desire to reduce the risk of the UK of failing to fulfil its international obligations clearly plays 
a significant influence in the UK’s model, but so does the supremacy of Parliament. Of particular 
importance is that the Human Rights Act is not entrenched. From the outset, the framers of the 
Act rejected the idea of entrenchment as they believed it was an unnecessary and undesirable 
32 ibid (n 27) s.1.
33 G.C.N. Webber, The Negotiable Constitution (CUP 2009) 4.
34 A Tomkins, ‘What’s Left of the Political Constitution?’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 2275, 2283.
35 See ECHR Article 8 and Article 10 as an example of this type of limitation clause. 
36 ibid (n 26) 86.
37 ibid (n 17) para 1.14.
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step contrary to the UK’s constitutional traditions.38 Instead, the Human Rights Act is at one 
level an ordinary Act of Parliament, as in theory like all legislation, the Human Rights Act “is 
vulnerable to express and implied repeal.”39 However, at another level, obiter in Thoburn v 
Sunderland City Council40 and the recent R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for 
Transport,41 suggest that not all legislation is equal, but rather there is a hierarchy, with a 
distinction to be drawn between ordinary and constitutional statutes.42 Traditionally “neither the 
Act of Union with Scotland nor the Dentists Act 1878 has more claim than the other to be 
considered a supreme law.”43 However, the obiter here represents a “departure from the 
traditional definition.”44 In Thoburn, Laws LJ suggested that a constitutional statute was to be 
exempt from the doctrine of implied repeal. If it could be shown “that the legislature’s actual...
intention was to effect the repeal or abrogation” through expressed words or words so specific 
that their inference was irresistible, only then a constitutional statute could be repealed by a later 
statute.45 Later legislation that was inconsistent (but not explicitly inconsistent) would cede 
priority to the constitutional statute. More recently in the HS2 case, Lord Neuberger and Lord 
Mance suggested not all constitutional legislation is equal in status.46 In both Thoburn and HS2 
the Human Rights Act is listed as a constitutional instrument.47 However, these comments 
remain obiter for now. The Human Rights Act is not entrenched. If the Conservative party wish 
to repeal it, they can do so via a normal parliamentary majority. Amending or repealing the 
38 ibid (n 17) para 2.16.
39 M Elliot, ‘Embracing Constitutional Legislation: Towards Fundamental Law?’ (2003) 54 NILQ 25, 29.
40 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin).
41 R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3.
42 ibid (n 39) 26.
43 A.V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of  the Constitution (9th edn, Macmillan and Co,1939)  145
44 S Boyron, ‘In the name of European law: the metric martyrs case’ (2002) 27 E.L. Rev. 771, 775.
45 ibid (n 40) [63] (Laws LJ).
46 ibid (n 41) [207] (Lord Neuberger).
47 ibid (n 40) [62] (Laws LJ), ibid (n 33) [207] (Lord Neuberger).
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Human Rights Act does not require a supermajority. Thus, at least in terms of its formal legal 
status, the Human Rights Act seems compatible with political constitutionalism.
A second consequence of UK constitutional traditions is that the framers did not envisage rights
protection as an exclusive responsibility of the courts.48 As Lord Falconer describes, “[the
Labour government] didn’t bring in the Human Rights Act to get a litigation culture.”49 Instead,
the aim was to have Parliament “play a leading role in protecting the rights which are at the heart 
of a parliamentary democracy."50 Consequently, the framers rejected the orthodox choice 
between the Courts and Parliament as the sole guardians of human rights.51 To do this, the Act
attempts to produce a shared labour approach between the executive, Parliament and the
judiciary with an emphasis on both pre-legislative and post legislative scrutiny. According to
Lord Irvine, it is an attempt “to create a society in which our public institutions are habitually,
automatically responsive to human rights considerations in relation to every procedure they
follow, in relation to every practice they follow, in relation to every decision they take, in
relation to every piece of legislation they sponsor.”52
These intentions behind the Act can lead to conflicting accounts regarding its purpose and
operation. For example, Alison Young, Richard Clayton, Tom Hickman and Francesca Klug all 
48 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘The Case for a Human Rights Commission’ Sixth Report of Session 2002-03 
(HL Paper 67-I/HC 489-I), at para 19.
49 Lord Falconer, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Reform’ (Human Rights and Constitutional Reform Law 
Society and Human Rights Lawyers' Association London, 17 February 2004).
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/2004/lc170204.htm> accessed 7 
April 2015.
50 ibid (n 17) para 3.6.
51 M Hunt, H Hooper and P Yowell, ‘Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit’ (Art and 
Humanities Research Council, 2012) 6, <http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/News-and-
Events/Publications/Documents/Parliaments-and-Human-Rights.pdf> accessed 10 February 2015.
52 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Minutes of Evidence on the Implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 
given by Lord Irvine of Lairg’ Session 2001-2002 (HL 66-ii, HC 332-ii) Q38.
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believe the Act represents an intention to balance rights protection and parliamentary sovereignty 
through the adoption of a dialogue model.53 Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell developed the 
model based on their observation of the Canadian human rights system. “If judicial decision is 
open to legislative reversal, modification or avoidance” then this is representative of a dialogue 
model.54 Here judicial and democratic actors can disagree with each other and ultimately 
parliamentary sovereignty is theoretically preserved as “the final decision is the democratic
one.”55 In contrast, Philip Sales and Richard Ekins argue that its purpose is to “provide a 
domestic remedial regime in relation to rights to which the United Kingdom is subject under 
international law.”56 With all constitutional actors involved “to replicate what they understand 
the ECtHR would decide in that situation.”57 Thus, they argue the Act is more balanced towards 
the compliance with UK international obligations and strongly disagree with the idea the Act 
promotes a dialogue model. 
3) The Human Rights Act’s Institutional Model of Rights Protection
The Human Rights Act attempts to ensure “human rights form part of the rules of the game” that
are recognised and respected by the government, Parliament and the judiciary.58 It seeks to create 
a culture of rights and responsibilities, in which the importance of having the need to respect 
53 A Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Hart 2009) 115-159; and R Clayton ‘Judicial 
deference and "democratic dialogue": the legitimacy of judicial intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998’ 
[2004] P.L. 33-47; and T Hickman, ‘Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act 
1998’ [2005] P.L. 306-335; and F Klug, ‘The Human Rights Act - a "third way" or "third wave" Bill of Rights’ 
[2001] E.H.R.L.R. 361-372.
54 P.W Hogg and A A Bushell, 'The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of 
Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing after All)' (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75, 79.
55ibid 80.
56 P Sales and R Ekins, 'Rights- consistent interpretation and the Human Rights Act 1998' (2011) 127 L.Q.R. 217, 
218.
57 ibid 228.
58 J Croft, ‘Whitehall and the Human Rights Act 1998 The First Year’ (The Constitutional Unit, UCL, London) 
<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/publications/unit-publications/88.pdf> accessed 16 April 2015.
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Convention rights is mainstreamed in the thinking and actions of political and judicial actors.59
The Act creates a model of rights protection which operates within what Janet Hiebert describes 
as a four stage institutional system.60 The first two stages relate to the pre-legislative context. 
These attempt to improve rights protection by integrating it into the existing legislative process 
involving the government and Parliament. The final two stages relate to post legislative scrutiny. 
Stage 3 engages the courts, and if stage 4 occurs, the government and Parliament engages in post 
legislative scrutiny. Given that three out of the four stages engage political actors, one could 
describe the UK’s model as a more politically orientated form of rights protection.61 However, 
we should not assume simply because of this that it is compatible with political 
constitutionalism. It must be determined if each individual stage is compatible with political 
constitutionalism. The question of compatibility was be considered at both a theoretical level and
in practice.  It may well be the case that despite being potentially compatible with political 
constitutionalism, it is not realised in practice. Finally, we must consider how compatible in 
practice these stages are with the different accounts of political constitutionalism. It may be that, 
the Act is more compatible for proponents of one account then the other. This might mean that 
the different account would perceive reforms to the Human Rights Act different. 
Stage One: Executive Rights Protection
The model begins with the internal consideration of the possible rights implications of legislation 
by the executive, as the majority of legislation is initiated by the government. This stage infuses 
rights consideration into the traditional legislative considerations by the government. It seeks to 
promote awareness within the executive about the possible implications of their plans with the 
59 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Minutes of Evidence on Human Rights Act: building the culture of rights and 
responsibilities given by Richard Wilson’ Session 2001-02, 21 March 2002, Annex B.
60 J Hiebert, ‘The HRA: Ambiguity about Parliamentary Sovereignty’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 2253, 2254.
61 ibid.
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conventions rights before they introduce their bill before Parliament. This culminates with the 
statutory requirement under section 19 of the Act for each minister to make a statement about the 
compatibility of their bill when they are introducing it to Parliament.62 A minister may give a 
statement to the effect that their bill is compatible. However, the minister may also state that they 
believe their bill may not, or is not compatible but wishes to proceed nonetheless.63 However, 
section 19 reports are merely the outcome of a series of pre-introduction considerations by the 
government. 
Before a bill can be introduced, it must receive the approval of the Parliamentary Business and 
Legislation (PBL) Committee of the Cabinet. This committee “manages the government's current 
legislative programme” and primarily exists to help ensure that the bill’s passage through 
Parliament is as smooth as possible. This Committee is primarily focused with reducing the risk 
of criticism, possibility of amendments and ensuring time wasting during the legislative passage 
of government business is kept to a minimum.64 The committee is in charge of choosing which 
bills will form part of the government legislative programme, whether the bill can be published 
in draft form, when the bill can be introduced to Parliament and which house the bill will be 
introduced in.65 As such, the Committee holds considerable power within the executive. 
Ultimately, the department seeking to introduce the bill will have to satisfy the PBL committee 
that their bill is ready and that other legal and procedural issues have been resolved before the 
government is willing to introduce the bill.66 The PBL requires an ECHR memorandum setting 
62 ibid (n 27) s.19 (1) (a).
63 ibid (n 27) s.19 (1) (b).
64 Cabinet Office, ’Guide to Making Legislation’ July 2014, 2.1 - 2.7.
65 Cabinet Office, ‘Guidance Legislative process: taking a Bill through Parliament‘ 20 February 2013
<https://www.gov.uk/legislative-process-taking-a-bill-through-parliament> accessed 16 April 2015.
66 ibid.
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out the bill’s compatibility before approval of the bill for introduction or publication in draft.67
The Cabinet Office Guide makes clear that rights consideration is “an integral part of the policy-
making process, not a last minute compliance exercise” and, hence, “early discussion with 
departmental legal advisers is essential.”68 The Cabinet Manual and Cabinet Guide to Making 
Legislation also provide a description of the ECHR and Human Rights Act for Ministers and 
their departments.  
The department must produce a memoranda that covers the rights issue raised with a frank 
assessment of the vulnerability to challenge in legal and policy terms.69 The PBL requires a 
“clear and succinct statement of the human rights considerations and the justification in ECHR 
terms for any interference” but such a statement should only make reference to significant cases 
and avoid over-lengthy discussion of the case law.70 Legal advice on compatibility will primarily 
come from departmental legal advisers and legal advisers in the Ministry of Justice’s Human 
Rights Division.71 Furthermore, once a memorandum is produced, it must be sent to the Attorney 
General's Office (referred to in the Cabinet Manual as the Law office) before submitting said 
memorandum to the PBL.72 The memorandum “must be cleared by the Law Officers before it is 
submitted to the [PBL] committee”73 However, even where the PBL and law office approve a 
bill, allowing it to be introduced, the guidelines make clear that “ultimately, it is the Minister in 
charge of the Bill who is accountable to Parliament for stating that the Bill is compatible with the 
67 ibid (n 64) 98.
68 ibid.
69 ibid 101 para 11.104.
70 ibid.
71 ibid 101 para 11.100.
72 ibid 100-101 para 11.102.
73 Cabinet Manual (1st edn, 2011) 53 para 6.31.
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Convention rights.”74 This is a reflection of the convention of individual ministerial 
responsibility and seeks to incentivise ministers to avoid risking their ministerial career by taking 
a lazy approach to matters relating to the Convention. 
The PBL Committee will aim to ensure a statement of compatibility can be given for the 
majority of bills, but section 19 (1) (b) recognises that this may not always be the case.75 This 
provision reflects a realistic understanding of the pressures on government. From time to time, 
the government will need to “proceed with legislation without being fully aware of its 
implications.”76 This occurred when the government introduced the Communication Bill 2003.77
Section 19 is said to have facilitated a growing sensitivity towards rights within the departments 
of government.78 However, it also appears to have resulted in “a far larger role in the policy 
process for government lawyers.”79 Stage one raises several questions. First, as a consequence of 
the need to present a section 19 report before Parliament has it resulted in a shift in government
and parliamentary behaviour? The enabling account of political constitutionalism might ask 
whether section 19 has resulted in the government having to abandon policy and engage in an 
overly cautious desire to avoid legal risk. The limiting account, on the other hand, may wonder if 
section 19 reports are open to abuse and whether they help improve parliamentary scrutiny of the 
government. 
74 ibid (n 64) 101-102 para 11.106.
75 ibid (n 27) s.19 (b).
76 ibid (n 26) 96.
77 Communication Bill 2003.
78 D Feldman, 'The Impact of Human Rights on the UK Legislative Process' (2004) 25 Stat.L.R. 91, 93.
79 ibid (n 30) 34.
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Stage Two: Legislature Rights Protection
Stage two is described as parliamentary rights protection and is concerned with the scrutiny of 
bills during their passage through Parliament. Here, the Human Rights Act seeks to infuse 
greater rights consideration into the traditional day to day legislative negotiations between the 
various actors within Parliament. Although it was possible before the Human Rights Act for 
parliamentarians to discuss the compatibility of legislation with the conventions, the Human 
Rights Act seeks to improve the likelihood of this occurring.  Murray Hunt views the Act as an 
attempt to foster “a culture of justification” which enhances Parliament’s role to protect rights. A 
culture of justification can be defined as a system where the adequacy of public justification for 
the interference or failure to protect a right is subject to transparent scrutiny.80 Section 19 has a 
dual function in this regard, as the statements by the ministers are open to scrutiny by 
parliamentarians who can question the minister’s belief that the bill is compliant. Failure to claim 
a bill is compatible by way of a section 19 (1) (b) report could be extremely problematic for the 
government as it is likely to give rise to increased scrutiny by Parliament, which in turn may 
leave the government open to criticism. This was clearly the intention behind section 19. As 
Lord Irvine described, failure to give a statement of compatibility will act as “a very early signal 
to Parliament that the possible human rights implications of the Bill will need and will receive 
very careful consideration.”81 Furthermore, section 19 could in some circumstances “focus 
attention both inside and outside of Parliament on whether there is compelling reasons to enact 
this legislation.”82
80 M Hunt, 'The impact of the Human Rights Act on the legislature: a diminution of democracy or a new voice for 
Parliament?' [2010] E.H.R.L.R. 601, 603.
81 Lord Irvine of Lairg, HL Deb 27 November 1997, vol 576, col 1163.
82 ibid (n 19) 699.
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In addition to section 19 reports, the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) can further 
assist Parliament’s role in scrutinising legislation. The JCHR has many advantageous qualities to 
facilitate this. Firstly, the committee is a dedicated joint committee for evaluating rights issues in 
legislation.83 Secondly, it is a permanent Joint Committee in Parliament.84 Traditionally, Joint 
Committees are ad-hoc, formed to specifically scrutinise a specific bill alongside the normal 
departmental select committees. The Committee has 12 members; membership is divided 
between elected MPs and the appointed Lords, six from each House.   Thirdly, the committee is 
said to have a “non-partisan ethos.”85 Hansard Society highlights “the arithmetic of the Lords 
representation means that the government has not had an overall majority.”86 The members of 
the Lords are recognised as being less partisan than the commons due to the weaker party 
discipline in the Lords.87 Additionally, committee members from the Commons are generally 
recognised as being less partisan then their front and back bench colleagues.  The decision to 
have a permanent Joint Committee allows the members from the Commons to “exercise a 
specifically parliamentary role (rather than a party political one).”88 The Hansard Society 
suggests Select Committees in general place emphasis on collegiality, consensus (where 
possible) and avoid party issues. 
JCHR performs multiple functions, embracing both pre- and post-legislative work.89 The JCHR’s 
pre-legislative work is more in line with traditional legislative scrutiny. Firstly, the committee 
scrutinises section 19 statements by pressing the minister to explain their justification. Secondly, 
83 J Hiebert, ‘Governing like a Judge’ in T Campbell, K.D Ewing, A Tomkins (eds), The Legal Protection of Human 
Rights (OUP 2011) 62.
84 ‘Joint Committees’ Hansard Society Briefing Paper, Issues in Law Making, Issue 9, June 2006, 2.
85 ibid 2.
86 ibid 1.
87 ibid 5.
88 ibid 5, Joint Committee on Human Rights ‘The Committees Future Working Practice’ Twenty Third Report of 
2005-06 Session, Appendix 1 (Klug Report) para 5.8.
89 C Tolley, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Rights in the United Kingdom: Assessing the Work of the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights’ (2009) 44 Australian Journal of Political Science 41, 45.
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it performs an assessment over risk of incompatibility based on existing domestic and 
international case law with the aim of being able to complete its reports before the second 
reading.90 In the process of performing these tasks, the JCHR collects evidence from minority 
groups, charities, pressure groups, academics, civil servants and other ministers. Therefore the 
committee’s primary function is to provide Parliament with “regular and often critical reports on 
the persuasiveness of the minister’s earlier claim that a bill is consistent with the Convention 
rights.”91 The hope being that these reports assist both the executive and Parliament in making an 
informed decision over whether the existing bill requires amendments and raises awareness of 
rights issues for future legislation. The JCHR’s post-legislative work relates to the following up 
declarations of incompatibility and Remedial Orders. This includes pressing the Government for 
a response following a declaration, oversight over Remedial Orders and scrutiny of the remedy.
The 2006 ‘Klug Report’ in the JCHR’s working practices highlighted that members of the 
committee held different opinions over the committee’s role. Interviews with members of the 
committee showed that some members believed their function was to provide ‘quasi-judicial’ 
legal advice to Parliament.92 In contrast, other members suggested the committee could have a 
broader approach of “advising Parliament to… help frame the agenda on issues of national 
importance concerning human rights, engaging with, and responding to, the public in the 
process.”93 In reaction, the committee has sought to accommodate both views into its working 
practices.94 Thus, the committee, in Hiebert’s opinion, is “an important component of the Human 
90 ibid 45.
91 ibid (n 60) 2254.
92 Klug Report ibid (n 80) para 13.1.i.
93 Klug Report ibid (n 80) para 13.1.ii.
94 Klug Report ibid (n 80) Summary 3.
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Rights Act project” as it is an important tool of raising rights awareness in both houses.95
Several questions arise from stage two. First, how does Parliament think about rights? For 
example does it just closely consider the case law or does it engage in a range of potential 
methods of considering rights? Critically for the limiting account of political constitutionalism, 
the question will be whether section 19 and the JCHR assist Parliament in scrutinising the 
government’s bills. In contrast, for the enabling account, the question will be as to whether
parliamentary scrutiny of section 19 and the JCHR present significant constitutional hurdles for 
the implementation of their legislation. 
Stage Three: Judicial Post Legislative Review
Stage 3 refers to the judicial review stage. Despite pre-legislative consideration and scrutiny of
rights issue, the possibility remains that legislation may be incompatible with Convention rights 
(or at least challenged on that basis in legal proceedings). The ECHR case law changes as what 
was once compliant can be found to be incompliant later under the living tree of interpretation. 
Furthermore, countless Acts remain in effect which did not go through the sort of rights-
informed legislative scrutiny described above due to being passed before the Act was introduced. 
Stage 3 requires the judiciary to ‘reduce the mis-match’ between the Convention and domestic 
law.96 This is to be achieved through sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act. Section 3 is the 
provision relating to the statutory interpretation of legislation by the courts.97 In contrast, under 
section 4, a higher court may issue a ‘Declaration of incompatibility’ which gives rise to stage 
95 J.L Hiebert ‘Parliament and the Human Rights Act: can the JCHR help facilitate a culture of rights?’ (2006) 4 
ICON 1,  28.
96 ibid (n 26) 87.
97 ibid (n 27) s.3.
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4.98 These two provisions are said to form a “comprehensive regime for dealing with legislation 
that is potentially contrary to one or more of the conventions rights.”99 The relationship between 
the two is that under section 3(1)  “[s]o far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and 
subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
convention rights” by the courts.100 Where it is ‘not possible’ to do so, a higher court may issue a 
declaration of incompatibility.101 The question of what is and what is not possible becomes 
paramount in understanding the relationship between these judicial provisions. Unfortunately, 
section 3 itself is unclear on what is meant by “so far as possible.” 
The leading case on the limits of section 3(1) is Ghaidan v Mendoza.102 The case revolves 
around paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 1 of the Rent Act 1977, which states on the death of a 
protected tenant of a dwelling-house his or her surviving spouse, if then living in the house, 
becomes a statutory tenant by succession.103 The Housing Act 1988 amended Schedule 1 of Rent 
Act to include “a person who was living with the original tenant as his or her wife or 
husband.”104 Thus marriage was not necessary. In the pre-Human Rights Act case of Fitzpatrick 
v Sterling House Association Ltd, the House of Lords held this provision did not include persons 
who are in a same-sex relationship due to gender specific connotations.105 In their lordships 
opinion, to interpret the provision as to allow same-sex relationships would go beyond the 
recognised standards of statutory interpretation, therefore, this was a matter for Parliament to 
98 ibid (n 27) s.4.
99 ibid (n 19) 703.
100 ibid (n 27) s.3 (1).
101 ibid (n 27) s.4 (1).
102 Ghaidan v Mendoza [2004] 3 W.L.R 113.
103 Rent Act 1977, Schedule 1 Para 2.
104 ibid Schedule 1 Para 2 (2).
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resolve should it wish.106 Ghaidan returns to this issue following the Human Rights Act coming 
into force. The question was whether this reading could be compatible with the Article 14’s 
prohibition on discrimination read in conjunction with Article 8.107 Their Lordship held it was 
not. As a consequence, they used section 3 to interpret the provision in a way which would be 
compatible with the Conventions rights. In doing so, their Lordships attempted to determine the 
limits of section 3.
Lord Nicolls stated that the use of section 3(1) does not depend on the presence of ambiguity in 
the legislation. Rather, even where “the meaning of the legislation admits no doubt, section 3 
may nonetheless require the legislation to be given a different meaning.”108 In doing so Nicolls 
acknowledged that “section 3 may require the court to depart from this legislative intention, that 
is, depart from the intention of the Parliament which enacted the legislation.”109 Thus section 3 
“enables language to be interpreted restrictively or expansively… It is also apt to require a court 
to read in words which alter the meaning of the enacted legislation, so as to make it Convention-
compliant.”110 Nevertheless, section 3 is subject to limitations. Firstly, the court is not entitled to 
violate a fundamental feature of the legislation. As Lord Rodgers stated “however powerful the 
obligation in section 3(1) may be, it does not allow the courts to change the substance of a 
provision completely, to change a provision from one where Parliament says that x is to happen 
into one saying that x is not to happen.”111 Therefore, the interpretation must “go with the 
106 ibid, 33-34, 67.
107 ECHR Article 8 and 14.
108 Ghaidan v Mendoza [2004] 3 W.L.R 113, [29] (Lord Nicholls).
109 ibid [30] (Lord Nicholls).
110 ibid [32] (Lord Nicholls).
111 ibid [121] (Lord Rodger).
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grain”112 and “underlying thrust of the statute.”113 Secondly, the courts should not make a 
decision for which they are not equipped.114 Lord Nicholls cites the decision of Bellinger v 
Bellinger115 as supportive of this approach. In Bellinger, the petitioner was a transsexual female
who when born had been classified as male at birth. She sought to use section 3(1) to make the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973116 compatible with the convention. The House of Lords declined 
to use section 3 on the grounds that in doing so their lordships would be required to handle issues 
they were ill-suited to deal with due to the potential wide ramifications of the outcomes.117
Under section 4 (2), the higher courts may make a declaration of that incompatibility.118 As 
Colm O'cinneide notes, section 4 allows the courts to make a statement “that sets out [on] their 
legal finding that the statute in question is not compatible with the Convention.”119 A declaration 
of incompatibility neither affects the continuing operation or enforcement of the legislation in 
question, nor does it bind the parties to the case in which the declaration is made.120 Instead, the 
“decision on whether to remedy the incompatibility by amending the legislation rests with the 
government and, ultimately, Parliament.”121 Thus, it “leaves the ball in Parliament’s court.”122
Section 4 appears to only allow the courts to prod Parliament into action to remedy the defect, 
112 ibid [121] (Lord Rodger).
113 ibid [33] (Lord Nicholls).
114 ibid [33] (Lord Nicholls).
115 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467.
116 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s.11(c).
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rather than strikes down the inconsistent legislation.123 Accordingly, Lord Scott’s description of 
section 4 as being a remedy that is “political in character rather than legal” seems apt.124
A more contemporary case over what is possible under section 3 (1) is R (GC) v Commissioner 
of Police of the Metropolis.125 The case regards the retaining of biometric data such as DNA 
samples and finger prints taken as evidence to be kept in aid of the detection of crimes at a later 
date. s.64 (A1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act,126 allows the Police to collect biometric 
data from a person in connection with the investigation of an offence. A later amendment states 
“samples may be retained after they have fulfilled the purposes for which they were taken but 
shall not be used by any person except for purposes” listed including the prevention or detection 
of crime.127 Although, the Association of Chief Police Officers provide guidelines which allowed 
Chief Officers the discretion to destroy the data in exceptionally rare circumstances.128 In a post 
Human Rights Act case of R (Marper) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, the House of Lords 
had held this regime to be compatible with Article 8.129 However, the ECtHR disagreed with the 
House of Lords in the case of Marper v UK. The ECtHR held instead this was a disproportionate 
interference with an applicant’s right to respect for private life under Article 8.130 Although the 
UK government was implementing legislation in response to Marper v UK at the time, the 
Supreme Court still had to make a ruling in GC on how to respond to Marper v UK now its 
previous precedent could not stand.131 Though the Supreme Court could have issued a 
123 ibid (n 119) 10.
124 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 A.C. 68, [145] (Lord Scott).
125 R (GC) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] UKSC 21.
126 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.64 (1A) (a).
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128 ibid (n 125) [4] (Lord Dyson).
129 R (Marper) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] 1 WLR 2196.
130 S and Marper v United Kingdom (2008) 48 EHRR 1169.
131 ibid (n 125) [15] (Lord Dyson).
64
declaration of incompatibility, instead the Courts used section 3.132 A 5/2 majority held “it is 
possible to read and give effect to section 64(1A) in a way which is compatible with the 
ECHR.”133 As Beverley Steventon reported, “the use of the word ‘may’ not ‘must’ allows for the 
reading of this section in a way that is compliant with article 8.”134 Lord Rodger dissented on the 
grounds he felt the use of section 4 would be more appropriate in the circumstances. In his view, 
Parliament had wanted to eliminate the danger of valuable evidence being lost and potential 
prosecutions of the guilty based on the latest science would be jeopardised if material had to be 
removed from the database. For that reason, “providing for the material to be retained on the 
database indefinitely was therefore the fundamental feature.”135 Given this, Lord Rodgers 
advocated that section 4 was a more suitable course of action.136 This difference in opinion about 
what was a fundamental feature of the Act in GC represents a good example of the continuing
uncertainty about when the courts feel it is appropriate to use section 3 or section 4. Although 
statutory interpretation is an essential part of the relationship between Parliament and the courts, 
section 3 is a significant expansion of statutory interpretation powers. Does section 3 represent a 
judicial amendment power and if so does this render it incompatible with political 
constitutionalism? It must also be asked as to whether the government and Parliament have the 
freedom to reject a section 3 interpretation at a later date? In regards to section 4, it must be 
determined if the provision really does leave the government and Parliament the freedom to 
respond. Finally, we must also consider whether these provisions cohere with the limiting and 
enabling accounts of political constitutionalism.
132 ibid (n 125) [65-66] (Baroness Hale).
133 ibid (n 125) [35] (Lord Dyson).
134 B Steventon, ‘DNA profile retention and the right to respect for private life’ (2011) 16(1) Cov. L.J. 55, 58.
135 ibid (n 125) [114] (Lord Rodger).
136 ibid (n 125) [121] (Lord Rodger).
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Stage Four: Democratic Post Legislative Review
The use of section 4 engages the fourth stage of the model. It is the junction between the political 
and legal actors in terms of post legislative scrutiny. Following a declaration by a higher court,
the judicial decision is open to legislative reversal, modification, or avoidance, the discretion lies 
with the political actors on how to proceed after a declaration of incompatibility. This is said to 
represent the dialogue model and should theatrically maintain parliamentary sovereignty.137
Chintan Chandrachud suggests that it should be viewed as creating two types of space for 
democratic actors to respond. First, there is a decisional space, this refers to freedom to respond. 
Decisions may be accepted, either fully or partially, it may also be rejected or it may be 
ignored.138 Should the government and parliament either reject or ignore the declaration, the 
claimant may go to the ECtHR, although they may not win. Thus in practice the government’s
freedom to ignore the decision is unlikely, they must either accept it, or reject it. In the latter 
case, they must be prepared to present their arguments to ECtHR as part of their treaty 
obligations. The second type of space is the remedial space, this refers to how democratic actors 
address declaration of incompatibility if they choose to accept the decision space.139 They can do 
the minimum necessary to accept or they may do something completely different. It also refers to 
the process in which they make the changes. This can take several forms. Under section 10 of the 
Human Rights Act, a minister of the Crown may make a remedial order, to fast track the 
amendments to incompatible provisions.140 This occurred after R (on the application of H) v The 
Secretary of State for Health.141 However, what has become far more common is to either repeal 
137 Jack Straw, HC Deb 21 October 1998, vol 317, col 1300.
138 C Chandrachud, 'Reconfiguring the discourse on political responses to declarations of incompatibility ' [2014] 
P.L. 624, 625.
139 ibid.
140 ibid (n 27) s.10, Schedule 2.
141 R (on the application of H) v Mental Health Review Tribunal for the North and East London Region and The 
Secretary of State for Health [2001] EWCA Civ 415.
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or amend through the ordinary legislative process. For example, following R (on the application 
of M) v Secretary of State for Health,142 the law was simply amended by the Mental Health Act 
2007.143 To determine stage 4 compatibility with political constitutionalism, we must analyse
how and why the government and parliament chooses to respond to declarations.  
Conclusion
This chapter has provided an overview of how the Human Rights Act operates. The Act creates 
an ambitious institutional model of rights protection which engages both political and legal 
actors over various stages. Nevertheless, the Human Rights Act poses serious implications for 
the UK’s Political Constitution, not only in terms of judicial power, but also regarding the day to 
day work by the government and Parliament. I have sought to raise questions regarding the Act 
and Political Constitutionalism. The most crucial question for political constitutionalists will be 
whether the expansion of judicial powers under the Act allows the courts to dominate the 
democratic institutions Furthermore; these judicial powers may also have implications for the 
judiciary’s relationship with the government and Parliament. The democratic form of rights 
protection also raises several questions for proponents of the limiting and enabling accounts; for 
example, whether they have resulted in a change in behaviour by the government and Parliament. 
It will be critical for the enabling account that these forms of democratic rights protection do not 
become a frequent obstacle to successful delivery of the policy. Proponents of the limiting 
account will be concerned with whether the Act has improved Parliament's ability to protect 
rights through the holding of the government to account. These questions will be considered in 
the following chapters.
142 R (on the application of M) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] EWHC 1094.
143 The Mental Health Act 2007.
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3.
Political Constitutionalism and Judicial Scrutiny under the 
Human Rights Act
Under the Human Rights Act, the judiciary plays a vital role in post-legislative rights protection
and scrutiny through Section 3 and 4. Therefore, it is critical to analyse whether these powers can 
be compatible with political constitutionalism. To answer this, one must first determine what 
type of judicial power might be compatible with political constitutionalism. I will suggest that 
weak-form judicial review can be compatible. I will then analyse whether sections 3 and 4 of the
Act are representative of weak form review, both in theory and practice. In the final section of 
this chapter, I will consider the possible implications of these powers for the different accounts 
of political constitutionalism identified in chapter one.
1) Weak Form Review and Political Constitutionalism
Mark Tushnet has used the terms ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ form judicial review to distinguish 
between different types of constitutional review. They represent opposing poles on a scale which 
can be used to measure judicial power. Where the judiciary has the ability to strike down, dis-
apply or “modify the effect of a statute to make its application conform with individual rights,”
their powers are said to be representative of strong form judicial review.1 Furthermore, “judicial 
interpretations of the Constitution are final and un-revisable by ordinary legislative majorities.”2
Instead, they require supermajorities to amend the constitution, or the court to overturn its own 
1 M Tushnet, 'New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights and Democracy Based Worries' (2003) 
38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 813, 824, J Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale LJ 
1346, 1354.
2 M Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional 
Law (Princeton University Press 2009) 33.
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precedents. In practice, given the high threshold required, the court’s interpretation of the rights 
prevails over the legislatures.3 In contrast, under weak-form review, the courts are given the 
opportunity to consider the constitutional compatibility of legislation “without displacing the 
ultimate power of legislatures to determine public policy.”4 The courts can “assess legislation 
against constitutional norms, but they do not have the final word on whether statutes comply 
with those norms.”5 The judicial interpretation may be rejected by political branches through 
more or less ordinary legislative activity.6
Applying this to political constitutionalism suggests that only weak form review can be 
compatible.7 Three arguments support this claim. First, weak form review theoretically preserves 
sovereignty of democratically legitimate institutions to decide if and how to respond to the 
court’s judgment.8 Second, the nature of weak review reflects the acceptance of the contestability 
of rights; they are open to disagreement and any decision about them is fallible.9 Third, weak 
form review provides for a more equal consideration of interests by political institutions than the
courts are able to provide.10 Weak review is representative of an editorial form of democracy, in 
that judgments serve as “editorial alarm bells” rather than authoritarian commands.11 Strong 
form review does not share these characteristics. An undemocratic institution effectively imposes 
3 ibid 21.
4 Tushnet, ibid (n 1) 831.
5 Tushnet, ibid (n 1) 831, ibid (n 2) IX. 
6 M Tushnet, 'Political Constitutionalism and Weak Form Judicial Review' Review’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal
2249, 2250.
7 R Bellamy, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Conventions: Political Constitutionalism 
and the Hirst Case’, in A Føllesdal, J K Schaffer, G Ulfstein (eds), The Legitimacy of International Human Rights 
Regimes: Legal, Political and Philosophical Perspectives, (CUP 2013) 254.
8 R Bellamy, 'Political constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act' (2011) 9 ICON 86, 89.
9 ibid (n 7) 254.
10 ibid (n 7) 255. 
11 R Bellamy, ‘Republicanism, Rights and Democracy,’ in A Niederberger, P Schink (eds), Republican Democracy: 
Liberty, Law and Politics (Edinburgh University Press 2013) 273.
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its own or a minority’s will over the majority, producing domination and other consequences for 
ordinary political activity.
Nevertheless, there is one potential problem for political constitutionalism. Weak-form judicial 
review is unpredictable because of a lack of guidelines on how political or legal actors should 
react to one another’s decisions.12 If it is used incorrectly, it can defeat its own purpose. It “may 
fail to protect democracy if despite having the opportunity to respond, the legislature is 
convinced that judiciary has greater authority to determine the decisions of rights.”13
Alternatively, it “may fail to protect rights if courts exercise restraint.”14 Tushnet contends this 
renders it unstable as it “may degenerate into a return to parliamentary supremacy or escalate 
into strong-form review.”15 For political constitutionalism, the latter is problematic. Weak form 
review provides little certainty that the judicial powers are not a Trojan horse for the strong-form 
review. Despite this, potential uncertainty should not render weak form review incompatible with 
political constitutionalism. Instead, political constitutionalism can provide guidelines to promote 
stability. Political actors should recognise the contestability of rights, that they give rise to 
different interpretations. Politicians should not be overly deferential to the courts.16 They must be 
willing to contest the court’s interpretation when they disagree. Political actors must “think 
twice, not blindly obey” the judgments of the court.17
12 A Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Hart 2009) 118-119.
13 ibid 119.
14 ibid 119.
15 Tushnet ibid (n 1) 814.
16 D Nicol, 'Law and Politics after the Human Rights Act' [2006] P.L. 722, 745.
17 C Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive? The Hamlyn Lectures 2005 (CUP 2006) 96. 
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There is a strong argument for viewing weak form review as compatible with political 
constitutionalism at a normative level. In practice, it will remain crucial that it does not collapse 
into strong form review. Therefore, one must analyse whether section 3 and 4 are representative 
of weak form review in both theory and practice to determine if they can be compatible. I will 
begin with section 4. I admit this seems counterintuitive given the structure of the Human Rights 
Act. Nevertheless, I feel that the strengths of section 4 and weaknesses of section 3 are best 
highlighted by adopting this structure. As I will argue below, while section 4 can be seen as 
compatible with political constitutionalism, section 3 cannot. Despite the desirability of section 4 
for political constitutionalists, under the Act, section 4 can only be used where it would be 
impossible to resolve the incompatibility with section 3. This further highlights the problems of
section 3 and structure of the Act for political constitutionalists.
2) Section 4 and Political Constitutionalism.
In theory, the power of a higher court to issue a declaration of incompatibility is representative of 
weak form review. Section 4 is designed to give the last word on whether to revise legislation or 
not to Parliament.18 It represents a clear intention by the framers to protect parliamentary 
sovereignty and maximize rights protection.19 Political branches may accept or reject the 
declaration. The Act requires a positive legislative action to accept the decision and remedy 
incompatibility. It does not require any positive legislative action to reject a declaration, although
ignoring or rejecting a declaration is likely to lead to the applicant challenging the decision 
before the ECtHR. As we shall see, many political constitutionalists find it to be the most 
18 ibid (n 8) 99.
19 Lord Irvine of Lairg, HL Deb 03 November 1997, vol 582 col 1228-1229.
Secretary of State for the Home Department ‘Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill’ Cm 3782, para 2.11-
2.13.
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desirable judicial power found in the Act. Connor Gearty has gone as far as describing section 4 
as “probably the most ingenuous and perhaps also the most effective” provision of the Human 
Rights Act.20
There are several arguments that suggest that section 4 appears to be normatively compatible 
with political constitutionalism. First, section 4 theoretically preserves parliamentary 
sovereignty. Richard Bellamy asserts that section 4 achieves this, as the final decision over the
correct interpretation of rights will be a democratic one. The government and Parliament retains 
control instead of the judiciary, thus providing assurances that the law will reflect the interest of 
citizens, rather than judges.21 Gearty adopts a similar view, claiming that section 4 invites “the 
political back in to control the legal at just the moment when the supremacy of the legal 
discourse seems assured.”22 Secondly, section 4 reflects an acceptance of the contestability of 
rights. A declaration merely offers “thoughtful opinions on rights.”23 The lack of binding legal 
effect means that a declaration is not “pronouncements of truth from on high” about the correct 
interpretation of rights.24 The court is merely saying “this is our truth on rights, now tell us 
yours.”25
Thirdly, section 4 can promote debate among citizens. According to Jeremy Waldron, 
declarations serve to “alert the public that this was not a trivial matter but a hugely important 
20 C Gearty, 'The Human Rights Act - an academic sceptic changes his mind but not his heart' [2010] E.H.R.L.R. 
582, 583. 
21 ibid (n 8) 110-111.
22 ibid (n 17) 95.
23 ibid (n 16) 743. 
24 ibid (n 17) 96.
25 ibid (n 16) 475.
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one, and not a right to be taken away lightly,” thus promoting a debate over the right.26 Similarly,
Danny Nicol suggests it allows judges to “influence political debate without stifling it.” He 
argues that a declaration has the potential to “grab headlines, thereby exposing rights issues to 
wider debate and forcing them up the political agenda.”27 The fourth argument is that it allows 
the courts to assist the political branches without overruling them. Gearty contends that there are 
“some rights issues… which judges are equipped to identify but not to resolve.”28 Furthermore,
Tushnet highlights that all legislatures have limitations, such as a lack of foresight, time 
constraints and draftsmanship problems.  They legislate knowing there is always the risk that an 
individual provision of their Act in practice may result in something unintended in specific 
circumstances. However, judges may be able to recognise a potential problem when a dispute 
comes before them. The judge can identify the issue and signal it to Parliament, who may in 
hindsight modify the law or uphold their original view on the provision.29 Furthermore, it might 
encourage a current Parliament to re-consider old legislation passed by previous Parliaments. It 
provides Parliament “an opportunity to cleanse the statute books of legislation which is 
outdated.”30 It can also provide a mechanism for helping minorities which are so “‘discreet and 
isolated’ that their concerns fail to gain a hearing through democratic politics.”31
The R(M) case could be an example of this.32 The Mental Health Act 1983 provided for the 
appointment of a nearest relative to the patient who was being detained for illness. The statute 
governed who was defined as the nearest relative and did not allow the patient to contest it. The 
26 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Oral Evidence on Human Rights Judgments given by Professor Jeremy 
Waldron’ Session 2010-2012, 15 March 2011, Q48 and Q61.
27 ibid (n 16) 747.
28 ibid (n 20) 583. 
29 ibid (n 6) 2253.
30 ibid (n 6) 2252.
31 ibid (n 7) 255.
32 R (on the application of M) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] EWHC 1094.
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purpose of the provision was to safeguard the interests of the detained patient.33 M’s adopted 
father had been appointed. However, M had previously accused him of sexually abusing her as a 
child. Jeff King describes this as an example of “classic legislative oversight.”34 In 1983, the 
government and Parliament simply failed to foresee such an issue arising. By giving a 
declaration, the High Court was able to alert the government and Parliament to this. They 
responded by considering the case and enacting the Mental Health Act 2007 to resolve this 
issue.35
Finally, Adam Tomkins has attempted to incorporate section 4 into his account of limiting 
political constitutionalism. Tomkins approves of section 4 because it leaves matters for 
Parliament to resolve.36 Moreover, in chapter one, it was noted that Tomkins had suggested that 
the courts should have the power to refer a matter back to Parliament where there is doubts about
the power being conferred on the executive.37 Indeed, Tomkins acknowledges this idea is heavily 
influenced by section 4.38 Therefore, there appears to be a normative argument for recognising 
section 4 as representative of weak form review and being compatible with political 
constitutionalism. Not all political constitutionalists are as approving of section 4. J.A.G. Griffith 
was sceptical of its design, stating it “argues in favour of parliamentary sovereignty while at the 
same time creating a situation in which governments may often be politically bound to support a 
judicial finding of incompatibility.”39 This suggests he was concerned that it would collapse into 
33 A Young, ‘Is Dialogue Working under the Human Rights Act 1998?’ [2011] P.L. 733, 782.
34 J King, ‘Parliament’s Role Following Declarations of Incompatibility under the Human Rights Act’ in M Hunt, H 
J Hooper, P Yowell (eds), Parliament and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart 2015) 168.
35 ibid (n 33) 783-784.
36 A Tomkins, 'The Rule of Law in Blair's Britain' (2007) 26 UQLJ 255, 267. 
37 See Chapter 1, 26.
38 A Tomkins, 'The Role of the Courts in the Political Constitution' (2010) 60 UTLJ 1, 21.
39 J.A.G. Griffith, 'The Common Law and the Political Constitution' (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 42, 51.
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strong review because “the pressure on the government to accept their judgment will be 
irresistible and parliamentary criticism ineffective.”40
The application of section 4 might concern political constitutionalists that the power has 
transmogrified into strong review. According to the latest Ministry of Justice statistics, there 
have been 29 Declarations granted, 9 of which have been overturned on appeal. 19 out of 20 
have been responded to so far. 95% of the time the government has accepted the court’s opinion 
and remedied the incompatibility.41 Some such as James Allen and Jonathan Morgan have used 
these statistics to claim that Parliament is in fact now de facto bound to follow the court’s 
opinions.42 However, a closer examination is needed. 
First, there are 4 cases which related to provisions that had already been resolved by Parliament 
at the time of the declaration.43 Secondly, I would argue we need to distinguish between high and 
low profile cases to better understand why the government and Parliament have accepted the 
court’s opinion. Low profile cases do not trigger either a negative response by Parliament or 
serious debates among citizens. They pass by under-the-radar of the lay person. The most likely 
reason for this is that a common element of these cases is that the claimants are part of often 
40 J.A.G. Griffith, 'Human Rights, Legal Wrongs' New Statesman (London 21 June 1998) 12.
41 Ministry for Justice, ‘Responding to Human Rights Judgments Report to the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
on the Government response to human rights judgments 2013–14’ (Cm 8962, 2014) Annex A 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389272/responding-to-human-
rights-judgments-2013-2014.pdf> accessed 04 April 2015.
42 J Allan ‘Statutory Bills of Rights: You Read Words In, You Read Words Out, You Take Parliament's Clear 
Intention and You Shake It All About’ 117; and J Morgan ‘Amateur Operatics: The Realization of Parliamentary 
Protection of Civil Liberties’ 436-427, both in T Campbell, KD Ewing, A Tomkins (eds), The Legal Protection of 
Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (OUP 2011).
43 See: R (on the application of Wilkinson) v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2003] EWCA Civ 814;
R (on the application of Hooper and others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] EWCA Civ 875;
R (Clift) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Secretary of State for the Home Department v Hindawi and 
another [2006] UKHL 54; R (Wright and others) v Secretary of State for Health and another [2009] UKHL 3.
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discrete groups and unlikely to register on the political agenda.44 As King’s review of 
declarations shows, many claimants include mental health patients,45 transgender persons,46 and 
lorry drivers.47 Similar to R(M), it is unlikely that the Labour or Coalition government set out to 
intentionally affect these minority groups. They either realised in hindsight their legislation had 
affected these groups in ways which they had not intended, or they disagreed with a past 
government’s legislation. As a result, the government and Parliament changed the law with little 
objection.48 80% of cases can be categorised as low profile, thus outweighing high profile cases.
In contrast, high profile cases are where the declaration triggers a public debate about whether to 
accept and how to respond to the court’s declarations. These cases become high profile because 
of strong vocal disagreement by members of the government, Parliament and the media. These 
declarations tend to relate to national security or involve applicants who are accused or convicted 
of criminal wrongdoing. High profile cases present a more troubling picture for political 
constitutionalism. Despite political actors disagreeing with the judicial interpretation, they have 
chosen to comply with the court’s interpretation, suggesting they see the declaration as binding 
on them. There are 4 cases which fall into this category: Anderson,49 A (Belmarsh judgment)50
and F and Thompson.51 Smith v Scott could also be added to this category, despite the situation 
44 ibid (n 34) 178.
45 R (H) v London North and East Region Mental Health Review Tribunal [2001] EWCA Civ 415; R (M) v 
Secretary of State for Health [2003] EWHC 1094.
46 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21.
47 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 158.
48 C Crawford, ‘Dialogue and declarations of incompatibility under Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2013) 
25 Denning L.J. 43, 60-61.
49 R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Office [2002] UKHL 46.
50 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56.
51 R (F and Thompson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 3170.
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being unresolved as of writing this; there is evidence of some attempts to comply with the 
interpretation.52
Anderson involved what Nicol described as a “turf war” over sentencing tariffs between the
Judiciary and the Home Secretary.53 The House of Lords held the Home Secretary’s sentencing 
powers under section 29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 was incompatible with Article 6 of 
the convention. Crucially, in Stafford v United Kingdom the ECtHR had already reached this 
judgment.54 Both judgments received a lukewarm reaction. The Home Secretary stated he was 
disappointed with the judgment.55 The Conservative opposition was critical.56 Merris Amos and 
Christopher Crawford claim the Home Secretary appeared anxious to give up his role in 
sentencing.57 Despite the apprehension and the freedom to reject the declaration, both the 
government and Parliament accepted the judicial interpretation and remedied the incompatibly 
with the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In this case, the ECtHR judgment clearly motivated the 
government to accept the Anderson declaration.58 Given the Home Secretary’s apprehension and 
the political opposition, it is unlikely the government would have amended the law, had it not 
been for the ECtHR judgment. The UK would likely have lost again if Anderson had gone before 
the ECtHR. 
52 Smith v Scott [2007] CSIH 9.
53 ibid (n 16) 741.
54 Stafford v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 32.
55 C Dyer, 'Blunkett loses key power to keep killers in jail' The Guardian (London 29 May 2002) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/may/29/ukcrime.immigrationpolicy> accessed 12 June 2015.
56 Dominic Grieve, HC Deb 28 October 2002 vol 391, col 605.
57 M Amos 'R v Secretary for the Home Department, ex p Anderson - Ending the Home Secretary's Sentencing Role' 
(2004) 67 MLR 108,116-117; ibid (n 48) 56.
58 Amos ibid 117.
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In Belmarsh, the indefinite detention of foreign suspects without charge was held incompatible 
with Article 5. Following the declaration, the Home Secretary told the Commons, “the 
government believe that the powers have played an essential part in addressing the current public 
emergency… however, I accept the Law Lords' declaration of incompatibility with the ECHR of 
section 23 of the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act.”59 The Prime Minister Tony Blair later
revealed in his autobiography “there was simply a fundamental disagreement between myself 
and the judiciary and media... Once the House of Lords made the ruling, we had to amend the 
law.”60 Furthermore, several prominent members of the Labour government were openly critical 
of the court’s interpretation.61 Yet the government did not have to respond or change the law. It 
could have defended its views before the ECtHR. The reason the government responded is likely 
to do with the circumstances it found itself in. The detaining of foreign terrorist suspects without 
trial had already proven to be a controversial issue among parliamentarians, the media and 
citizens. The Commons did not appear to reject the Lords decision, feeling a more appropriate 
scheme was needed, and some opposition MPs praised the government for accepting the 
decision.62 As Crawford states in this case, “the government amended the law, not because it 
thought that it was wrong, but because the political pressure to do anything else was just too 
great.”63 Another argument is to do with timing. There is evidence that the judgment “caught the 
government off guard.”64 It was handed down less than 6 months before the 2005 general 
election. It is possible that the government was reluctant to challenge the courts during the run up 
59 Charles Clarke, HC Deb 26 January 2005 vol 430, col 305-306.
60 T Blair, A Journey: My Political Life (Random House 2010) 575.
61 'Lords wrong on detainees - Straw' (BBC News. 17 Dec 2004) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4103987.stm> accessed 12 May 2015.
62 See HC Deb 26 January 2005, vol 430, David Davis (Conservative) col 309; Mark Oaten (Liberal Democrat) col 
312.
63 ibid (n 48) 68.
64 J L. Hiebert and J B. Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights: The New Zealand and United Kingdom Experiences
(CUP 2015) 312.
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to the election. To openly reject the judicial interpretation would have had political consequences 
on the campaign. It would have distracted the campaign debate and provided the opposition with 
ammunition. Thus, the temporal circumstances transpired against the Labour government.
F and Thompson is the first high profile case to be dealt with by the Coalition government. The 
declaration held the inability of those on the sex offenders registers to have their indefinite 
notification requirement subject to review as being incompatible.  Once again, there is strong 
evidence of disagreement over the judicial interpretation. The press claimed “the Supreme Court 
ruling will open the door for hundreds of serious criminals to conceal their sick past.”65 The 
disagreement appears more vocal by the Conservative side of the Coalition, with the Prime 
Minister and Home Secretary openly disagreeing with the judgment.66 Despite the clear 
objections, the government complied by doing the “minimum necessary.” The Sexual Offences 
Act 2003 (Remedial) Order 2012 remedied the incompatibility. Unlike Labour, the 
Conservatives had shown “a deep hostility to the Human Rights Act” and Strasbourg before 
taking office.67 Surely they must have felt more willing to disagree with a domestic court’s 
interpretation, especially considering Labour also seemed unsupportive of the judgment.68
Nevertheless, despite Labour’s attempts to force the Home Sectary to openly admit she was not 
under any obligation to accept the judicial opinion before the commons,69 the Home Secretary 
65 R Smith, 'No No No' (New Law Journal 21 May 2010) <http://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/nlj/content/no-no-no> 
accessed 12 May 2015.
66 A Travis, ‘David Cameron condemns supreme court ruling on sex offenders’ The Guardian (London 6 February 
2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2011/feb/16/david-cameron-condemns-court-sex-offenders> accessed 
12 June 2015.
67 ibid (n 16) 464-469.
68 ibid (n 48) 83. 
69 Jack Straw, HC Deb 16 February 2011 vol 531, Col 960.
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was presented herself as being “de-facto bound.”70 There are two potential reasons for this. The 
junior partners in the coalition government, the Liberal Democrats, appeared more inclined to 
accept the declaration.71 Therefore, the Conservatives were begrudgingly forced to amend the 
legislation in order to keep the coalition intact.72 A more cynical argument is presented by Gavin 
Phillipson. He claims the Conservatives have sought to “weaponise the declaration of 
incompatibility,” using it to generate public hostility against the ECHR, the Act and judges.73 He 
fears that by misrepresenting the judgment and its legal effect, the Conservatives have actively 
encouraged short-term political defeats to feed a long term campaign. 74 If Philipson is correct, 
then this presents a serious problem for political constitutionalism; not only is the government
supporting judicial domination, but they are also potentially attempting to distort a future debate 
by misleading citizens, thus conflicting with the values of open government.  
The final case is Smith v Scott, which follows from the ECtHR Judgment of Hirst regarding the 
UK’s blanket ban on prisoner voting.75 Neither the Labour nor the Coalition government fully 
responded to Hirst and Smith. However, the Labour government held two consultations during 
the 2005-10 Parliament, but did not produce a bill. The Coalition government published a draft 
“Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill” in 2012. Yet the government did not bring forward the bill 
in their final Queens Speech before the 2015 election.76 There was also a prisoners voting debate 
in the House of Commons, which resulted in a non-binding but authoritative rejection in 
70 G Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, Dialogue and Constitutional Principles’ in R Masterman, I Leigh (eds), The 
United Kingdom's Statutory Bill of Rights, Constitutional and Comparative Perspectives (OUP for the British 
Academy 2013) 48.
71 ibid (n 48) 84.
72 ibid (n 48) 84.
73 ibid (n 70) 49.
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75 Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2) [2005] ECHR 681.
76 A Horne, I White, ‘Prisoners’ voting rights’ (11 February 2015) House of Common Library, Standard note: 
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principle of prisoner voting.77 Both the Labour and Coalition government appeared critical of the 
judgment, yet they have also clearly accepted it and attempted to remedy it. Similarly to
Anderson, the shadow of the ECtHR judgment and their international obligation appears to be 
the biggest source of pressure to comply. Janet Hiebert and James Kelly suggest another reason 
might be that they faced financial rather than political pressure. The large number of prisoners 
meant the government faced “substantial costs of litigation and compensation associated with the 
failure to enact remedial measures.”78 It is unlikely that the current Conservative government
will comply before it attempts to introduce a replacement bill of rights
A possible explanation for all high profile cases is that political actors believe there is a high 
threshold of disagreement required to disagree with the court’s opinions. During the passage of 
the bill, an example of where the government would disagree was if courts held abortion laws to 
be incompatible. In such circumstances “it would be wrong simply to accept what the Committee 
had said, and that a right to abortion, albeit quite properly limited and developed in this country 
over a period of 30 years, should suddenly be cast aside.”79 As Hiebert suggests, this implies 
Parliament should only disagree with a court decision to protect a right.80 As a result, Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats might have set themselves a high threshold. In contrast, one would 
assume the Conservative Party would adopt a much lower threshold given their criticism of the 
Act. Thus, political constitutionalists should be interested in how the Conservatives respond to a 
high profile declaration during 2015-2020 Parliament. A future reform could seek to convince 
77 HC Deb, 10 February 2011 vol 523 col 493-584.
78 ibid (n 64) 382.
79 Jack Straw, HC Deb, 21 October 1998, vol 317, col 1301.
80 J L. Hiebert, 'Governing under the Human Rights Act: the limitations of wishful thinking' [2012] P.L. 27, 32.
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both government and Parliament that the threshold should not be seen as high as the example 
given in 1998 by the framers. 
While in theory section 4 appears representative of weak form review, in practice it is less clear. 
Although the overall picture is not as bad as some have claimed. This is not to deny the 
responses to high profile cases identified above are not problematic for political 
constitutionalism. However, they represent a minority of cases and the behaviour of the 
government and Parliament can still change. On a case by case basis, there has been a range of 
reasons which suggest why each compliance occurred. Nevertheless, as the Human Rights Act is 
less than 20 years old, we can only observe it over a short period of time, which is simply “too 
brief for sweeping generalisations” about Parliamentary responses or the development of a 
convention.81 There is a case for seeing section 4 as representative of weak form review and in 
practice being predominately compatible with political constitutionalism. 
3) Section 3 and Political Constitutionalism
In contrast, section 3 is more problematic for political constitutionalists as the power appears 
more representative of strong form review. There are three problems with section 3; first the 
interpretation powers are too expansive. Second, said powers do not appear to be subject to 
sufficient democratic oversight and finally, Section 3 is the primary judicial power for resolving 
potential incompatible legislation. This final problem relates to the interplay between section 3 
and section 4, potentially making the former redundant.  
81 ibid (n 34) 167.
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Political constitutionalism accepts the need for some degree of statutory interpretation to ensure 
that the will of Parliament is applied by the courts. Parliament’s will, as a whole, can only be 
expressed through the words of the text it enacts.82 This reveals the practical limits of the 
legislature’s law making powers. As Bellamy accepts, “with the best will in the world, one 
cannot hope to eradicate all such linguistic problems. Nor can legislators be expected to foresee 
all the potential cases and circumstances to which their legislation may be applied.”83 However, 
the extent in which Parliament is able to control the courts through the words it uses is 
important.84 In the face of ambiguity, the courts have used the purposive approach to find the 
intention that can be reasonably attributed by Parliament to the Act.85 As Jeffrey Goldsworthy 
argues, the courts must act as “an agent striving to interpret and apply statutes equitably, so as 
better to serve the legislature's values, intentions and purposes.”86 This ensures parliament’s 
legislative intentions are enabled, but it gives judges “a (partly) creative role in attributing to 
legislation an ‘underlying purpose.”87 The ability of judges to engage in creative interpretation 
can be reduced through clear intentions and precise wording. This is desirable for political 
constitutionalism as it reduces the scope for judicial discretion, ensuring the courts will respect 
Parliaments and distance judicial decision-making from the political fray.88 Although Parliament 
may even intentionally leave ambiguities for the judiciary to resolve.89 This is because it remains 
82 J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP 1999) Ch 4.
83 ibid (n 8) 103. 
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“open to Parliament to change the law in response.”90 For political constitutionalism, some 
statutory interpretation must be necessary and tolerable for a productive relationship between 
Parliament and the courts.
Yet under section 3 (1) “purposivism has been eclipsed” by a far stronger form of 
interpretation.91 This expansion of interpretative powers coupled with the abstract nature of the 
convention rights results in the judges being able to “exercise their political judgments in the 
process of interpretation much more widely than in the past.”92 Section 3 is poorly drafted 
providing no guidance to the judiciary. Section 3(1) simply states the court should adopt a 
Convention compatible reading ‘so far as it is possible to do so.’93 As Gearty highlights, the 
problem with the word ‘possible’ is that it can be “construed to deliver effective judicial 
supremacy… or it can be so narrowly restricted that the intended effect of section 3 is largely 
neutered.”94 In the early years of the Act, the lack of guidance resulted in uncertainty over the 
scope of what was possible.95 Although the situation is now more stable as the parameters have
been established by the courts, the current approach is problematic. With the benefit of hindsight, 
Parliament should have drafted section 3 more precisely themselves, instead of leaving it to the 
judges to determine.96
90 ibid (n 16) 728.
91 ibid (n 16) 729.
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The judicial set parameters established in Ghaidan appear to suggest section 3 is more 
representative of strong from review. First, unlike the purposive approach “a section 3 
interpretation is not stopped in its tracks when faced with a statute which, in its ordinary meaning 
violates convention rights.”97 As Allan argues it allows just about any statutory language to be 
given some other meaning by judges. Furthermore, when coupled with the ability to read in 
words without any ambiguity present, “the legislation under consideration is not in any real sense 
of interpretation. It is being re-written.”98 Similarly, Aileen Kavanagh claims, the use of section
3 can sometimes be indistinguishable from legislative amendment.99 In her view, section 3 has 
the greater effect of displacing the power of Parliament than a more traditional form of strong 
review such as a strike down power. This is because unlike a strike down power, section 3 takes 
the power of how to proceed out of the hands of Parliament. It “does not confine itself to the 
negative task of merely identifying the existences of rights violation. It also takes the further 
positive step of implementing corrective action.”100 As Kavanagh concludes, “if judges rectify 
the statute themselves by way of judicial interpretation under section 3, they effectively engage 
in a form of judicial amendment.”101 Therefore one might describe Section 3 as “conferring 
‘interpretation on steroids’ on the unelected judiciary.”102
The most controversial example of this power remains in R v A.103 In the case, the House of 
Lords used section 3 to re-write section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 
Nicol is critical of this judgment, arguing that section 41 plainly represented the “intention of 
97 A Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK HRA 1998 (CUP 2009) 319. 
98 ibid (n 42) 111.
99 ibid (n 93) 15.
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Parliament to severely restrict the circumstances in which complainants could be interrogated 
about their sexual histories.”104 However, this “clarity of parliamentary purpose in no way 
inhibited the House of Lords. Nor did the fact that the words of the statute were as plain as day. 
Their Lordships boldly held that section 41 (3) (c), construed in accordance with the s.3 HRA 
interpretative obligation.”105 Although the House of Lords decisions of Re S,106 Anderson107 and 
Ghaidan108 have stepped back from this approach, many still consider R v A “as the highpoint of 
judicial creativity.”109
One may argue, even where the Judiciary engages in creative interpretations of statutes, 
democratic institutions can still choose to uphold it, reverse it, or suggest an alternative 
interpretation through ordinary legislative activity.  This suggests that section 3 can operate 
much like a declaration of incompatibility; a section 3 interpretation gives scope for dialogue 
between the courts, the government and Parliament.110 As Alison Young suggests, the use of 
section 3 by the courts sends out “a different signal” to democratic institutions than a Section
4.111 Unlike, section 4, section 3 interpretations cannot be passively ignored.  Instead, they must 
be actively overridden, in sufficiently clear and precise terms.112 One might suggest despite the 
questionable expansion of interpretation, sufficient democratic oversight can control section 3 to 
make it more compatible with political constitutionalism, as democratic institutions retain the 
104 D Nicol, 'Statutory interpretation and Human Rights after Anderson' [2004] P.L 274, 275.
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freedom to overrule re-writes preventing domination. However, in 2006, Nicol claimed there was
no real practice of this occurring in the UK.113 If this remains the case, then section 3 is 
representative of strong form review. If Parliament is reluctant to challenge the judiciary over 
interpretations, then the judiciary will have the stronger constitutional position.114
Thus, it is critical to determine whether the situation has changed since Nicol’s claim.  To answer 
this question, a closer examination of how Parliament responds to section 3 interpretations is 
required. One major problem is that unlike responses to declarations, there is no official record 
of section 3 interpretations published by the Ministry of Justice. A review by Crawford in 2014 
represents an unofficial record. He identified 59 recorded upheld cases where section 3 was used 
to interpret a provision of an Act in convention compliant way.  In 7 cases, Parliament had 
already completed or was engaged in the process of amending legislation.115 In 9 cases 
Parliament formally accept the court’s interpretation via statutory amendments. In only 1 case 
there has been a rejection of the interpretation.116 Following M, Applicant,117 the Scottish 
Parliament repealed section 93(2) (b) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 with the Children’s 
Hearing (Scotland) Act 2011. However, the 2011 Act does not appear to accept the court’s 
interpretation of section 93(2) (b) from M, Applicant.118 This means in the majority of cases, 
Parliament has not chosen to respond. 
113 ibid (n 16) 729.
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For political constitutionalism, it is important to understand why the government and Parliament 
accepted the court’s interpretation. However, we simply cannot tell if Parliament has given 
implied consent to re-write, or disagreed, but been unwilling to challenge the court 
interpretation.119 It appears democratic institutions are unable to pick up this different type of 
signal emitted by section 3. If this is the case, then why have section 3 re-writes failed to appear 
on the parliamentary radar?   The answer may be that section 3 re-writes are extremely difficult 
to spot. One reason for this might be a result of the limits of section 3. By not re-writing 
fundamental features and going with the flow of the Act, judicial creativity remains subtle. The 
limits ensure judicial re-writes do not engage in radical, whole sale reform of statute. Such an 
approach as seen in Re S was firmly rejected by the House of Lords.120 Instead, as Kavanagh
argues, the judicial law making power is incremental rather than radical.121 There are significant 
constraints on judges. They must operate within precedent and they can only deal with issues that 
come before them on a case by case basis.  Thus, judges are only able to “engage in partial and 
piecemeal reform.”122 This approach ensures the less radical statutory renovation, the less noise
produced by the re-write. Although the power afforded to judiciary has increased, it has done so 
in a way which produces a signal that Parliament cannot detect. As a consequence, the 
interpretation remains lost in a sea of cases; maybe the only people able to spot the signal are the 
sharks circling the case out of interest. 
Nor does the signal seem strong enough to attract the attention of the media, who can, in turn 
bring it to the attention of citizens and the government. This is because as Nicol has argued, 
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‘rewrites’ of legislation under section 3 are a relatively invisible means of changing the law 
when compared to headline-grabbing declarations.123 Even if section 3 re-writes are spotted by 
journalists, they present a challenge of how to communicate to their audience the significance of 
it. Explaining to a lay person how and why the courts have interpreted an Act is a more 
challenging task than stating the court has found a law incompatible. A declaration of 
incompatibility makes for a more compelling story. Perhaps it’s plausible to understand why the 
average citizen has little interest in, or remains unaware of section 3 interpretations. However, it 
is concerning where Parliamentarians remain unaware. For example, only a year after the R v A 
judgment, a Private Members Bill was put forward by several Labour MPs to change the law on 
rape in favour of complainants. As Nicol comments, they were seemingly unaware of the 
decision of R v A.124 It is plausible that a similar situation has occurred following M, Appellant. 
According to Crawford, it is unclear if the Scottish Parliament actually knew of the judgment. 
The judgment was handed down within the same month a rejecting provision was approved.125
Therefore, even in the one rejection, it is hard to determine if the rejection was intentional.  The 
judicial power under section 3 has increased, allowing judges to engage in creative re-writes that 
are akin to strong form reviews. Yet at the same time, sufficient democratic oversight of such re-
writes has not occurred. Parliament may be able to overturn these re-writes, but clearly lacks the 
ability to track them. 
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4) The Interplay between Section 3 and Section 4
Section 4 should be seen as more compatible and desirable for political constitutionalists than 
section 3. Therefore, the heavy use of section 3 effectively renders section 4 redundant.126 It has 
been suggested by some that while legal constitutionalists aiming to promote ECHR as a higher 
law prefer maximising the use of section 3 to resolve incompatibilities. In contrast, political 
constitutionalists prefer a narrow reading of section 3 to promote a more routine practice of using 
section 4, as it will produce debates about rights.127 For example, Tom Campbell, Francesca 
Klug, Keith Ewing, Gearty and Nicol have all argued for greater use of section 4.128 The greater 
the use of section 4, the more possibility there is of debate over interpretation of rights by not 
just the courts, but also democratic institutions and citizens. However, this leads to the final 
problem of section 3. In order for a high court to issue a declaration of incompatibility, the courts 
must find it impossible to resolve the incompatibility with section 3. Accordingly section 3 must 
preclude section 4. Although as Gearty suggests it is possible to narrowly restrict the intended 
effect of section 3, this is not current practice of the judiciary, nor was it the intention of the 
framers. 
First, as Lord Steyn established in Ghaidian, “section 3(1) is the prime remedial remedy and that 
to resort to section 4 must always be an exceptional course.”129 According to Steyn, the judicial 
practice of section 3 and 4 before the early years of the Act was incorrect; the courts had relied 
too greatly on the latter at the expense of the former. Instead, it should be seen that section 3 is 
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the principal remedial measure, and that the making of a declaration of incompatibility is a 
measure of last resort.130 Second, during the passage of the Human Rights Bill, the Lord 
Chancellor stated “in 99% of the cases that will arise, there will be no need for judicial 
declarations of incompatibility.”131 Similar statements were also made in the Commons; Jack
Straw stated “we expect that, in almost all cases, the courts will be able to interpret legislation 
compatibly with the convention.”132 Philip Sales and Richard Ekins have argued these statements 
appear to reject the idea that the Labour government sought to promote dialogue between the 
courts and Parliament. Instead their primary goal is to provide domestic remedies and ensure 
compliance with the convention.133 They argue “the point of enacting section 3 was to introduce 
a new interpretative direction that would improve the likelihood that legislation would be 
interpreted to conform to the ECHR.”134 Effectively, the goal of judicial powers is for the 
domestic courts to “replicate what they understand the ECtHR would decide in that situation.”135
In many cases “the government does not want the last word and is quiet happy to let the court 
make the decision on these questions thus obviating the need for them to rectify the problem.”136
This avoids the need for the government or Parliament to spend time engaging in post legislative 
review.
Furthermore, using section 4 sparingly damages the effects when it is used as it feeds two
presumptions. The first presumption is that under section 4, the courts feel they “are effectively 
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forcing the executive, through Parliament, to change the law.”137 This makes judges more 
reluctant to use it and makes the government and Parliament more reluctant to challenge the 
courts over rights interpretations. This prompts the misguided view that if the government were 
to disagree with the courts, it would “provoke a constitutional crisis.”138 This might explain why 
Parliament has voiced disagreement, yet it remains reluctant to reject the judicial 
interpretation.139 The second presumption is that section 4 is an undesirable remedy to the 
individual. This incentivises the greater use of section 3. It has been argued that section 4 
provides “no incentive for individuals to litigate human rights cases because there is no 
opportunity of overturning the law in question.”140 Since section 4 is only a potential political 
remedy rather than a legal one, it is unhelpful for the disappointed applicant.141 For example, 
Ewing has pointed out in the Belmarsh case “the detained individuals remained in custody until 
new legislation was introduced, giving the Home Secretary the power to detain them at home by 
way of control orders, a form of de facto indefinite detention that was worse for some than the 
indefinite detention in Belmarsh.”142 The concern is that the perceived weakness of section 4 
might place pressure to adopt more robust and creative interpretations to avoid issuing
declarations.143 A political constitutionalist’s interpretation of section 4 is that, instead of being 
an empty remedy, the courts should recognise it as a powerful right of petition. The courts should 
see themselves as an influential body akin to the Bank of England or the British Medical 
Association. Under this conception, section 4 can be re-envisaged as a claim before democratic 
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institutions made by an individual who has been able to rally the support of influential 
backers.144 Reducing the scope or repealing section 3 might achieve this and make the third 
stage more compatible with political constitutionalism.
5) Judicial Scrutiny and the Different Accounts of Political 
Constitutionalism
The limiting and enabling account of political constitutionalism may view these powers 
differently from another. I would argue that section 3 presents a more unique problem for the 
limiting account. Therefore, its proponent would favour its complete repeal, leaving only section 
4 as the sole judicial power. Conversely, this would suggest that proponents of the enabling 
account might instead advocate reforms rather than the complete repeal of section 3.
The problem for the limiting account is that section 3 might allow the executive to by-pass post 
legislative parliamentary scrutiny. As Timothy Endicott suggests “If the courts can remove an
apparent incompatibility by interpreting it away, the government will not need to make a 
remedial order. A declaration of incompatibility means that the government controls the form of 
any change… but the government may not want this.”145 Section 4 allows for the government
and Parliament to debate the matter. There is evidence that the government and the Judiciary are 
engaging in post-legislative changes without Parliament’s expressed approval. As Lord Philips
pointed out “counsel for the Secretary of State usually invites the court to read down however 
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difficult it may be to do so, rather than make a declaration of incompatibility.”146 He suggests 
this occurred in the control order case AF.147 He further revealed that “provided that the main 
thrust of their legislation is not impaired they have been happy that the courts should revise it to 
make it Convention compliant, rather than declare it incompatible.”148
The strength and appeal of section 4 is that it promotes debate and allows parliament to consider 
whether to accept the court’s view. If the government via counsel is advising the courts to use 
section 3, it is producing some form of dialogue, but it is a dialogue that doesn’t involve 
Parliament. It may be the case that Parliament agrees with executive and judiciary on the matters. 
However, section 3 renders Parliaments current views irrelevant, as Parliament has no say on the 
change. Furthermore, as argued above, section 3 interpretations appear to be invisible to the 
parliamentarians; the government has not published an official record of these interpretations. By 
arguing in the court room for section 3 and failing to inform Parliament, the government can 
avoid the potential risks of a defeat or criticism by keeping parliamentarians in the dark. For the 
limiting account, section 4 is a neutral measure. It could allow Parliament to use the judicial 
argument to strengthen their own.149 As Fergal Davies has suggested “the declaration of 
incompatibility should be seen as a ‘moment’ capable of galvanizing parliamentary and popular 
dissent.”150 On the other hand, it can allow government to engage in blame avoidance, using the 
declaration to withdraw or roll back a policy it no longer feels is necessary or effective, without 
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being subject to attack by the opposition for doing so.151 The matter is effectively de-politicised. 
The criticism is focused at the judiciary rather than the government.  Despite this problem, 
section 4 remains neutral; de-politicisation can be contested by Parliament. Both the government
and Parliament can use declaration as ammunition to support their views in a debate. 
Alternatively, where both are in agreement they can use the declaration to reject the courts.
In contrast, this might suggest section 3 is less problematic for the enabling account. If the 
government advocates the use of section 3 via counsel and the court can use the power to re-
write the provision to go with the grain in the way the government wants. This ensures the 
government is still able to achieve its legislative goals. Section 3 would therefore avoid potential
constitutional obstacles that might result out of a declaration which disables the government
from successfully delivering its policies.152 Section 3 could serve to reconcile the intention 
behind the current legislation with the intention behind the Human Rights Act of ensuring
compliance with the UK’s international obligations. This makes sense in regards to the 
arguments presented by Sale and Ekins over the intention behind the Human Rights Act.  As 
Kavanagh claims, a “section 3 Interpretation seems like a clean bill of health in human rights 
terms.”153 The government is able to in the broad sense successfully get through its policies, 
while complying with its international obligations. In contrast, a declaration could become a 
“major governmental headache,” as Philipson suggests “remedial action is time consuming and 
may involve re-jigging the parliamentary timetable and thus delaying other legislation rather 
dearer to the government’s heart.”154 The enabling account uses the successful delivery of policy 
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as the way of holding the government to account by citizens. A section 4 leaves the government
open to problems within Parliament which prevent the successful delivery of policy. The crux for 
the enabling account is therefore one of control: how section 3 can be reformed to ensure 
interpretations are more aligned with intentions behind the legislation, and to not allow the 
judges to replace the government’s interpretation with their own.
Conclusion
In conclusion, there is a strong case for seeing section 4 as representative of weak form review. 
This means it can be seen as compatible with political constitutionalism in theory. In practice, it 
is mostly compatible. Reforming it should go as far as ensuring the prevention of a parliamentary 
convention which makes the declaration a binding rather than advisory judicial opinion. Section
3 appears more representative of strong form review. Nonetheless, how to reform this provision 
is likely to give rise to disagreement between political constitutionalists. The enabling account is 
likely to favour reforming the provision to ensure greater democratic control. Conversely, the 
limiting account is likely to favour the repeal of section 3, in order to maximise parliamentary 
debate and scrutiny in the post legislative review stages of the Human Rights Act. 
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4.
Political Constitutionalism and Democratic Scrutiny under 
the Human Rights Act
The framer of the Human Rights Act envisaged that “Parliament itself should play a leading role 
in protecting the rights which are at the heart of a parliamentary democracy."1 In chapter 2, I 
explained how the Human Rights Act seeks to achieve this over various stages which engage the 
government and Parliament in pre and post legislative consideration of rights issues. This is 
achieved through the statutory obligations on the government under section 19, parliamentary
scrutiny which includes ordinary debate and the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) and 
finally potential post legislative consideration following a declaration of incompatibility. This
chapter will examine the relationship between these democratic forms of scrutiny under the 
Human Rights Act and political constitutionalism. The Human Rights Act seeks to change the 
way in which democratic actors engage in rights. As a consequence, this raises questions for 
political constitutionalism about how rights are debated by democratic actors. It also raises 
questions about how the limiting and enabling accounts of political constitutionalism perceive 
these forms of scrutiny. One may assume that these forms of scrutiny are prima facie compatible 
with political constitutionalism as they engage democratic actors in rights review. However, as 
we shall see, things may not be as straightforward as this suggests. Therefore, one must take into 
consideration how political actors think and engage in debates about rights. 
                                                          
1 Secretary of State for the Home Department ‘Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill’ Cm 3782, 13. 
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1) Political Constitutionalism and a Culture of Rights
Members of the Labour government such as Lord Irvine and Mike O’Brien claimed that “a 
culture of awareness of human rights will develop” with the Act serving as “van” for the 
promotion a rights culture.2 Nevertheless, they were not explicit about what is meant by a culture 
of rights.3  Some believe this is nothing more than “an illusion of governmental aspiration for 
transforming society.”4 Others believe it refers to a minimum “expectation that prospective state 
actions that implicate rights should be subject to scrutiny of their merits and legitimacy before 
they are passed into law.”5 Danny Nicol has presented two interpretations which are significant 
to political constitutionalism. The first interpretation is what he calls a culture of compliance.6
This interpretation takes its cue from the works of Alec Stone Sweet’s Governing with Judges.7
Stone Sweet observes that in mainland Europe there is a culture of what he calls judicialization 
where by judges develop authority over the normative structure of a state and in doing so shape 
how individuals interact with each other.8 This has several consequences on ordinary political 
culture. First, the government begins to anticipate adverse judicial decisions.9 At the same time, 
the opposition parties begin to use judgments to win debates which “they would otherwise lose 
in normal un-judicialized politics.” 10 This further incentivises the executive to shape its 
legislation in ways which complies with judicial interpretation. The governing majority becomes 
subject to autolimitation as it engages in anticipatory behaviour, sacrificing initially held policies
                                                          
2 HL Deb 03 November 1997 vol 582 col 1227-312; Mike O’Brien MP, HC Deb 21 October 1998 vol 317 col 1322;
HC Deb 09 April 2001 vol 366 col 458W; and J Straw, ‘Building a Human Rights Culture’ Address to Civil Service 
College Seminar (19 December 1999).
3 F Butler, ‘Building a Human Rights Culture’ in C.J. Harvey (ed) Human Rights in the Community: Rights as 
Agents for Change (Hart 2005) 65.
4 ibid.
5 J L. Hiebert, 'Governing Under the Human Rights Act: The Limitations of Wishful Thinking' [2012] P.L. 27, 30
6 D Nicol, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Politicians’ (2006) 24 LS 451, 453.
7 A Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (OUP 2000).
8 ibid 13. 
9 ibid 73. 
10 ibid 55.
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to avoid parliamentary attack and judicial censure.11 This results in a political culture where the 
executive and “legislators engage in structured deliberation of the constitutionality of legislative 
proposals.”12  
A culture of compliance presents problems for the enabling account. Under this culture, “judges 
enjoy the dominant role.”13 They are the ultimate decision makers in both the pre and post 
legislative context, not just through constitutional review but also through their ability to hold a 
monopoly of influence over political debate. They also influence future debates further through 
their obiter comments and extra judicial speeches.14 Autolimitation will result in the governing 
majority abandoning its plans in the face of constitutional obstacles such as parliamentary
disagreement and judicial censure. In the post legislative context, there will be problems. For 
example, if a delivered electoral promise is found incompatible, the governing majority will have
no decisional space and no remedial space.15 They will not only feel unable to oppose the 
judgment of the court, but also unable to deviate from the exact opinion expressed by the courts. 
For proponents of enabling political constitutionalism, these court-inspired hurdles represent an 
unwelcome check on the government’s ability to pursue its policy goals. Furthermore, this 
appears to sap the qualities of parliamentary politics treasured by some political 
constitutionalists. As both the government and opposition begin to rely more on legal precedent, 
debates will become more structured, akin to legal discourse.16 The scope for disagreement 
decreases as the focus becomes more about technical issues of interpretation. This reduces the 
                                                          
11 ibid 75. 
12 ibid 73.
13 ibid (n 6) 454.
14 ibid (n 6) 726.
15 C Chandrachud, ‘Reconfiguring the discourse on political responses to declarations of incompatibility’ [2014] 
P.L.  624, 625. 
16 See also M A. Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (The Free Press 1993). 
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potential creativity that some political constitutionalists feel disagreement can yield.17 There is 
nothing wrong with legal arguments being raised, but they should be part of a rich range of 
arguments and not be seen as a superior form of discourse. Although Parliament would remain 
sovereign, the practice of politics within it would be constrained by “the straitjacket of law.”18
Ultimately, the Convention rights would be elevated beyond the reach of contestability.19 It also 
might reduce the values of open government as Parliament becomes more like a court in which
MPs conceal “their ideologies under the cloak of objective neutrality.”20 Nevertheless, the 
enabling account would have to tolerate judicial deference where citizens voiced strong vocal 
support for a judicial judgment. Even if the leaders of the government party disagreed with a 
judgment, they may have to accept in order to continue to have the support of citizens in the 
future. 21
In contrast, it is debatable whether a culture of compliance would be problematic for the limiting 
account. The issue here is that a culture of compliance can assist Parliament in holding the 
government to account. Legal precedents can serve as a floor for rights protection for 
parliamentarians to maintain. In some circumstances, Parliament will be able to secure 
concessions it would not have been able to otherwise. Yet in other circumstances, a culture of 
compliance can weaken Parliament’s ability to hold the government to account as precedent can 
be used against Parliament. For instance, in the event that the government wanted powers to 
intercept communication, it would draft the legislation in a way which would comply with 
                                                          
17 See J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP 1999) 23; and G Gee, ‘The Political Constitutionalism of J.A.G.
Griffith’ (2008) 28 L.S. 20, 26-27.
18 M Loughlin, Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship Between Law and Politics (Hart 2000) 5.
19 D Nicol, 'Are Convention rights a no-go zone for Parliament?' [2002] P.L. 438, 438.
20 D Nicol, 'Professor Tomkins' House of Mavericks' [2006] P.L. 467, 471.
21 R Bellamy, ‘The Political Constitution and Human Rights Act’ (2011) 9 ICON 86, 102.
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existing legal precedent. The government feels able to achieve its goals by doing the minimum 
necessary to comply with legal precedent. Despite this, during its passage, a significant number 
of MPs may feel that more safeguards are required. Perhaps citizens also disagree with the 
government on the matter. To win this debate, both sides must convince those MPs who remain 
undecided. The government might be able to convince those undecided MPs by claiming their 
critics’ calls are unnecessary by using the case law as evidence to support their arguments. 
Therefore, legal precedent might also serve as a glass ceiling. Yet in either circumstance, the 
superiority of legal discourses over all others is implied, contrary to political constitutionalism’s
rejection of this.22 Those academics who are prone to speaking the language of the limiting 
account of political constitutionalism frequently agree with the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights’ assessment over the government’s.23 Yet the committee is arguably more of a culture of 
compliance in its reasoning. This might suggest that the limiting account places less emphasis on 
the richness of discourse than the enabling account. Instead, it appears to emphasise the 
accountability of the MPs and how effective they are at scrutinising the government to protect 
the common good. For example, although Adam Tomkins is critical of the superiority of law, his 
core criticisms against legal constitutionalism are that judges are unaccountable and ineffective 
rather than how they discuss and debate right issues.24 Nicol has even suggested Tomkins would 
prefer Parliament to behave like a Court.25
                                                          
22 J.A.G. Griffith, 'The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1, 20; and A Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution
(Hart 2005) 12.
23 see K.D Ewing and J C Tham, 'The Continuing Futility of the Human Rights Act' [2008] P.L. 668, 674-693; and
A Tomkins, ‘Parliament, human rights and counter-terrorism’ in T Campbell, K.D Ewing, A Tomkins (eds), The 
Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (OUP 2011) 13-39; and C Gearty, 'The Human Rights Act - an 
academic sceptic changes his mind but not his heart' [2010] E.H.R.L.R. 582, 586.
24 Tomkins ibid (n 22) 25.
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As well as a culture of compliance, Nicol also draws on the idea of a culture of controversy.” 26
It is influenced by Tom Campbell’s work.27 Here, rights are recognized as being political in that 
they are open to disagreement. The culture is “political rather than legal in its nature, preferring 
debate to litigation and voting in representative assemblies to voting in the court room, 
particularly when fundamental interests are at stake”28 This culture rejects the absolute deference 
to courts of the culture of compliance. The culture believes no one institution has a monopoly of 
wisdom over rights.29 Instead, it favours more debates about rights by political actors. Nicol 
suggests that this culture of rights is more likely to develop. Firstly because the UK’s perceived 
traditional position as a political constitution will be resistant to a radical culture overhaul.30
Secondly, he sees the Human Rights Act as designed to facilitate such debates about rights. 
According to this conception, the Human Rights Act is a unique constitutional instrument 
designed to enable Parliament and the government as well as the courts to participate in giving 
“further effect” to fundamental rights.31 This culture would appear to overcome the issues for a 
culture of compliance poses for the enabling account and limiting account. For the enabling
account, it appears not to add any more restraints on the executive than already exists. It does not 
denounce legal discourse, but instead views it as being neither superior to political discourse nor 
the only form of consideration in the legislative process. Similarly, a culture of controversy is not 
problematic for the limiting account as it means debates are neutral in that they do not favour the 
government or Parliament any more than normal.  
                                                          
26 ibid (n 6) 454.
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28 ibid 25.
29 ibid 26.
30 ibid (n 6) 455.
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We can conclude that, generally speaking, a culture of controversy is more desirable to both 
accounts of political constitutionalism (although a culture of compliance might be acceptable for 
both in some limited circumstances). These cultures represent extreme ends of the scale; normal 
political consideration and debate within the UK is likely to continuously drift between the two 
depending on a variety of factors around the debate. While some debates might lean towards a 
culture of compliance, others may lean towards a culture of controversy. The crux for political 
constitutionalism will be the freedom to drift between the two rather than being boxed into a 
culture of compliance.
2) Executive Protection and Political Constitutionalism
With or without the Human Rights Act, some degree of a culture of compliance exists within the 
executive. The Parliamentary Business and Legislation (PBL) Committees’ existence is 
representative of this behaviour. 32 PBL Guidance states “parliamentary time available for 
government bills is extremely limited.”33 Any potential parliamentary delays will result in time 
being lost and “can have a knock-on impact on the programme as a whole.”34 As a consequence, 
“any government has a strong interest in being fully informed of whether a legislative initiative 
has a serious chance of being litigated and of ways to reduce risks before deciding to commit 
itself politically to introduce the legislative bill.”35 Additionally, the government is responsible 
for upholding the UK’s obligation under international law. Therefore, compliance with the 
ECHR was considered before the Human Rights Act. As Aileen Kavanagh points out, “like it or 
                                                          
32 Cabinet Office, ‘Guide to Making Legislation’ July 2014, 9.
33 ibid.
34 ibid 10, para 2.4.
35 J L. Hiebert, ‘Legislative Rights Review: Addressing the Gap between Ideals and Constraints,’ in M Hunt, H J 
Hooper, P W Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart 2015), 47.
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not, these are legal documents which have a body of jurisprudence built up around them.”36
Furthermore, litigation in a domestic or international court is expensive.37 Although our ability to 
evaluate the government is hampered by a lack of transparency because of confidential 
documents and the 30 year rule,38 there is good reason to suspect under the Human Rights Act, a 
culture of compliance will increase. The statutory obligation under section 19 means the 
government has to confront the issue of compliance with the Convention more than previously. 
Section 19 not only increases the frequency of consideration of compliance, but also introduces 
new domestic implications. By its design, inability to claim a bill is compatible with the 
convention is likely to bring unwelcomed negative attention on the government.39 Therefore,
section 19 should incentivise greater consideration and compliance with the convention. As of 
writing this, only 2 bills introduced by the government into the Commons have come with a 
section 19(1) (b) report.40 This statistic may indicate a culture of compliance has developed. 
Interestingly, evidence suggests although the government now considers rights and the legal 
implications in greater detail, surprisingly it has done so in a way which does not appear to 
shackle the government.41 Thus, while some of the mechanisms and practices we would expect 
to see in a culture of compliance have developed, their effects have been no-where near those 
                                                          
36 A Kavanagh, ‘The Joint Committee on Human Rights: A hybrid Breed of Constitutional Watchdog’ in M Hunt, H 
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observed by Stone Sweet in mainland Europe. Interviews conducted by Janet Hiebert and James 
Kelly present three core findings. First there is a strong presumption to ensure that each bill can 
be put before Parliament with an s.19 (1) (a) compliance report.42 Second, there is increased legal 
evaluation of bills with the convention and case law. Under the Human Rights Act the quality of 
legal evaluations has become “more robust and sophisticated” than before.43 For example, the 
number of legal experts within each department has increased.44 Further legal advice comes from 
the Ministry of Justice 45 and external counsel. 46 The PBL also require each department to 
produce a “memorandum setting out the impact, if any, of a bill” on a convention rights, which 
will need to be vetted by the Attorney General’s office.47 Thus, any bill since the commencement 
of the Human Rights Act appears to be subject to a “multi-layer process” of legal scrutiny.48
These two findings would be predicted symptoms of a culture of compliance developing within 
the executive. 
The third finding is unexpected; Hiebert and Kelly’s research found both the Labour and 
Coalition governments showed considerable risk taking over compliance. This finding is partly 
based on their interviews, the way in which compliance is assessed and frequency of 
disagreement between the government and the JCHR. Legal advisors within each department 
assess compatibility by way of risk assessment. The standard is on the balance of a probability, 
does the bill have a chance of being held incompatible.49 Hiebert and Kelly considered this a low 
                                                          
42 ibid (n 37) 274.  
43 ibid (n 37) 272.
44 ibid (n 37) 273. 
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threshold on the government.50 Legal advice is not binding on the minister.51 Although the 
Attorney General is the ultimate legal advisor within the government, it is possible that political 
pressure might result in his or her approval despite the risk.52 Additionally, the Cabinet Office 
guide to ministers states the assessment should be based on his or her own view.53 Furthermore
stating “ultimately, it is the Minister in charge of the Bill who is accountable to Parliament for 
stating that the Bill is compatible with the Convention rights.” 54 Thus, there is scope for 
minister’s personal judgment. This might explain why interviews suggest bills have been 
approved by the PBL even with a high risk level.55
Hiebert and Kelly suggest legislation such as the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2006 and Civil Partnership Act 2004 all appeared to be more risky 
than 50 per cent.56 However, Heibert and Kelly’s claim is based on interviews and the level of 
disagreement between the JCHR and the government. The JCHR applies a different standard and 
has a different focus. While the government adopts risks of domestic legal defeat, the committee 
focuses on scrutinising, convention compatibility, safeguards and other issues. They do concede 
that the issue of proportionality is a continuous source of disagreement between the government
and JCHR.57 For these reasons, Hiebert and Kelly argue that section 19 (1) (a) reports often mask 
substantial political judgments that may not be based solely on interpretation of case law.58 Thus,
section 19 (1) (a) reports can give a false impression about culture of compliance within the 
                                                          
50 ibid (n 37) 286. 
51 ibid (n 35) 48.
52 ibid (n 37) 277.
53 ibid (n 32) 98.
54 ibid (n 32) 101-102 para 11.106.
55 ibid (n 37) 280.
56 ibid (n 37) 359.
57 ibid (n 37) 282.
58 ibid (n 37) 269. 
106
executive. The minister may in their own personal opinions believe their legislation is compliant, 
despite legal advice.59 The minister may falsely represent their legislation as compliant.60  This 
willingness to take risks, to proceed despite the legal advice shows that a culture of compliance 
appears to have not taken hold within the government. The government has “demonstrated strong 
reluctance to allow concerns of compliance with the [Human Rights Act] to substantially 
constrain” themselves.61 This confirms Nicol’s prediction in 2004 that the roots of political 
constitutionalism run deep and are resistant to cultural overhauls.62 Nevertheless, it is unclear 
whether such a risk taking attitude is shared equally across all departments. It is possible that 
some departments might be keener than others to place more weight on the legal assessment, 
than other political consideration. It does seem that in most contentious matters or centre piece 
policies, the Government is not shackled by a culture of compliance. 
This reveals a paradox about section 19 and the Government. Section 19 has incentivised greater 
sensitivity to rights within government.63 Yet contrary to the expectations it has done so in a way 
which does not substantially constrain the government. This paradox begins to reveal a tension 
between the enabling and limiting account of political constitutionalism. The paradox shows the 
government is incentivised to consider the potential impact of their legislation in a more robust 
way than before. This provides further evidence to support claims that the Government takes
rights related issues seriously. It does this without placing the government into constitutional 
constraints. In contrast, section 19 might present problems for the limiting account. 
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3) Parliamentary Protection and Political Constitutionalism
Another potential reason for the government’s ability to take risks relates to Tomkins’s reality of 
government principle.64 If the government is liable to try to do whatever it can get away with, 
then the level of scrutiny over section 19 reports by Parliament impacts the scope of the 
government’s freedom. If the government appears willing to take risky legislative gambles, this
suggests parliamentary scrutiny of section 19 reports is not as high as would be expected in a
culture of compliance.  As Nicol, Hiebert and Kelly have all argued, a culture of compliance is 
not especially prominent in all parts of Parliament. The House of Commons appears to be 
uninterested in effectively scrutinising the government’s section 19 reports.65  The JCHR and 
House of Lords appear more interested yet they cannot bind the Commons; in practice they need 
to convince the Commons to support their views. Yet where the JCHR and House of Lords have 
raised concerns about the government’s assessment, the Commons has frequently appeared
apathetic. Although, from time to time some MPs have expressed direct doubts about the 
Ministers report, rarely does it affect the direction of the debate. For example, during the second 
reading on the Terrorism Bill, only 1 MP directly questioned the minister’s claim of 
compatibility.66 MPs tend to express concerns about human rights in a less focused manner; 
section 19 appears not to serve as a lightning rod for human rights issues. Human rights issues 
are raised in a more general way in debates. Thus, direct scrutiny of a section 19 (1) (a) report 
currently is a relatively low hurdle for the government to overcome. 
Furthermore, where the government has brought forward an openly incompatible bill, it appears 
to have not improved the Common’s willingness to securitise the government. To date the 
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government has only had to give a section 19 (1) (b) report twice.67 These were given at the 
introduction of the Communication Bill 2003 and the House of Lords Reform Bill 2012. While 
the Communication Bill became law,68 the House of Lords Reform bill did not. The way in 
which the Commons responded to the section 19 (1) (b) reports differs. The House of Lords 
Reform bill was withdrawn by the government due to persistent backbench pressure.69 The 
Deputy Prime Minister was unable to state the bill was complaint due to the UK’s ongoing issues 
with the blanket ban on prisoner voting following Hirst v UK.70 MPs were critical of reforming 
the UK’s second chamber to make it for the most part directly electable. Contrary to what would 
be expected in a culture of compliance, during the second reading, the section 19 (1) (b) report 
was never raised by a single MP.71 Since the incompliance related to prisoners voting, which 
Parliament had already firmly rejected, 72 it is probable that the rebels felt raising the compliance 
argument would not have helped their cause. In contrast, during the Communication Bill, the 
Commons was willing to debate the rights implication following the minister’s section 19 (1) (b) 
report.73 Several opposition MPs were keen to debate the human rights implication with the 
minister.74 It is possible, the opposition merely seized the opportunity to criticise the government
as this was the first 19(1) (b) report. Alternatively, the bill had implications to Article 10 
Freedom of Expression, which is traditionally well understood by MPs; perhaps MPs were more 
willing to debate it. There is little evidence to suggest that the failure to bring forward an 
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incompatible bill presents a hurdle for the government during the second reading, or that section
19 has improved Commons scrutiny of the government during the second reading.  With or 
without a section 19 (1) (a) report, the Commons generally places little emphasis on the 
minister’s report. Thus, despite its aim for improving parliamentary scrutiny, section 19 has done 
little to improve the Commons ability, which should disappoint proponents of the limiting 
account. 
In contrast, the JCHR does place considerable emphasis on the section 19 report. Their focus is 
to provide “regular and often critical reports on the persuasiveness” of the section 19 reports.75
The committee has been praised by political constitutionalists such as Tomkins, 76 Richard 
Bellamy 77 and Jeremy Waldron. 78 Tomkins has claimed the committee has “worked to 
strengthen the political constitution.”79 There are several reasons for being supportive of this 
claim for the limiting account of political constitutionalism. First, the JCHR seeks to improve
Parliament’s own ability to consider rights, instead of leaving rights with the government and the 
courts. It does this by highlighting issues, providing a narrative and helping to gain concessions 
from the government.80   Second, the committee has a strong reputation for scrutinising the 
government, frequently requiring ministers to present additional evidence before the committee. 
For example, the committee makes evidential based judgments in its reports.81  Third, it is also 
often critical of the judiciary’s decisions. The committee has in the past criticised the Judiciary 
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for failing to protect rights. For example, the JCHR was critical of the JJ judgment.82  Lord 
Brown’s judgment held permanent home confinement of no more than 16 hours a day would be 
compliant with the convention.83 The JCHR disagreed, recommending 12 hours.84 Fourth, it does 
not share some of limitations of the courts. The JCHR is not constrained by precedent.85 Nor 
does it need to give deference to the government.86 The JCHR is able to return to matters as it 
does not need litigation to arise before it can reconsider a matter. Evidence of this includes the 
JCHR’s persistent calls to Parliament not to renew powers conferred on the executive such as 
indefinite detention87 and control orders.88 Furthermore, the JCHR can continuously press the 
government to respond to the ECHR judgments and Declarations of Incompatibility.89 The JCHR 
must take some credit for the fact that the UK has attempted to respond to all declarations. The 
high level of compliance of declarations of incompatibility identified in chapter 3, suggests the 
JCHR is effective at placing continuous pressure on the government for a response. The 
government’s decisional space to ignore a declaration is considerably reduced by the JCHR. 
Fifth, the committee also provides an opportunity for minorities and the vulnerable to be 
represented in the parliamentary process and whose concerns often can fail to gain a hearing or 
are under-represented during the ordinary political debate.90 Research shows 60% of references 
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by MPs of the JCHR were made in relation to marginal groups and the vulnerable.91 This helps
supports the claims that Parliament can and is able to consider minorities and the vulnerable in 
society.
However, there are several arguments that raise doubts about the appropriateness of limiting 
accounts’ faith in the JCHR. The first is that the JCHR has a strong legal element in practice. The 
committee sees itself “as the guardian of Strasbourg values” within the parliamentary process92
As Kavanagh suggests, the committee seems to assist non-specialist parliamentarians in
understanding the implications of government bills, domestic and international case law and 
values.93 Yet Joo-Cheong Tham, for example has criticised the JCHR for adopting a far too 
legalistic approach that is inaccessible to parliamentarians, resulting in “greater barriers to 
political deliberation.”94With its focus on ensuring compliance with the ECHR and a higher 
standard of care towards compliance, the committee is easier to categorise as adopting a culture 
of compliance in its practices. The committee of course tends to use the ECtHR case law as a 
floor rather than a ceiling in its approach. Nevertheless as Kavanagh argues presenting the JCHR 
as “a mascot of political constitutionalism” is misguided as it effectively turns a blind eye 
towards the legal dimensions of the committee’s work, focusing more on its parliamentary and 
democratic credentials.95 It also appears to downplay the fact that half of the JCHR members are 
Lords, and thus unaccountable on an individual basis. The committee is also reliant on its legal 
adviser. Tomkins claims the JCHR shows what “Parliament could achieve” in terms of rights 
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protection and holding the executive to account over the judicial methods.96 However, this seems 
to ignore the questions of how this high standard was reached, focusing on whether the people 
who make the argument are democratic and if they are critical of the government. 
Secondly, the effectiveness of the JCHR is underwhelming. Research by Murray Hunt, Hayley 
Hooper and Paul Yowell suggests similar to section 19 reports, the House of Commons is 
generally apathetic to the work of the JCHR. Although on the one hand there has been an
increase in the substantive references to the JCHR reports since 2005.97 34% of those references 
were made in the Commons, the rest were made in the Lords.98 References to the JCHR report 
were popular in the context of counter terrorism, crime and health care.99 They distinguished 
between high frequency users who made over 30 references and the medium frequency users. 
Only 2 MPs were identified as high frequency users and both of them were on the JCHR and 
their references represented 38% of all references within the House of Commons. 100 Their 
research also shows at least 16 direct JCHR references resulted in the government offering the 
amendment.101 These are low figures considering the research covered from the creation of the 
JCHR in 2001 to May 2010. More concerning for the limiting account is that 15 of these 
amendments have been accepted by the government not as consequences of pressure from the 
Commons, but from pressure from the Lords.102  In the same way as Nicol’s observation in 2004,
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the House of Lords engages more in the behaviour of a culture of compliance and continues to 
remain so.103
Although these figures might be disappointing, amendments are “only one form of committee 
influence, and arguably not even the most important.”104 As Benton and Russell’s research has 
shown the influence of committees takes many forms including influencing debate, spotlighting 
issues, providing expert evidence, accountability and exposure and critically generating fear.105
The JCHR’s ability to secure amendments may disappoint some, but their presence helps 
maintain the standard of rights consideration we saw within the government. One can presume 
without the JCHR, the government would likely be able to adopt a lower standard because of 
“the ongoing lack of human rights awareness in Parliament.”106 Benton and Russell’s research 
shows ministers do not enjoy giving evidence before the committees which prompts greater 
policy consideration. One official told them that frequently ministers thought about “how would 
I explain that to the committee?”107 In this regard, the process of consideration within the 
executive may assist ministers. The improved internal mechanisms of rights consideration have 
helped the government predict and respond to parliamentary concerns over human rights. 
Evidence given to the JCHR by Harriet Harman shows that the Labour government felt the 
JCHR’s calls for safeguards were redundant since the government’s own internal consideration
will have considered and normally rejected these safeguards.
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“We are tooled up to the point at which we believe we can rely on that legal 
advice, so that basically, if we finally get the advice from the Attorney General 
that something can be done, then I do not think there is anybody else who can 
trump that in the government's mind. The government is not likely to think 
again about the legal issues once it has had all the legal advice going up as far 
up as the Attorney General if it needs to, but I do think the issues of how we 
take forward legislation, how we monitor, how we review, how we promote, 
whether we have the right framework, whether accountability under the 
framework is operating effectively, and in particular pieces of legislation 
which affect human rights… are very important work of the committee and 
very important for government.”108
Similar evidence was given to Hiebert and Kelly and Benton and Russell in their studies that 
“once government has decided to introduce a bill and has reached a judgment about how to 
interpret the statutory reporting obligation, this judgment will not (be) revised once a bill is 
introduced regardless of what the JCHR say.”109 This is not unique to the JCHR. Benton and 
Russell have highlighted that in general the government is unwilling to change its mind, although 
“there is increased likelihood of acceptance and implementation of smaller-scale changes”
recommended by committees. 110 Therefore, one may argue that more robust internal rights 
consideration by the government, makes the likelihood of the government compromising by 
accepting amendments in the face of parliamentary concerns is less likely. This reduces 
Parliament’s role in rights consideration.
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There is currently little evidence to suggest scrutiny of section 19 reports or the JCHR opinions 
present any significant constitutional obstacles preventing the government from delivering its 
policies.   A culture of compliance has not taken hold, despite improvements to both the 
government and Parliament’s abilities to consider human rights issues. Although, there remains 
great potential for Parliament to improve its abilities to scrutinise the government by making 
better use of the JCHR, it is very disappointing for limiting account to see this opportunity being 
wasted. As Tomkins claims the JCHR shows what “Parliament could achieve” (emphasis 
added). 111 Nevertheless for the limiting account, it would be wrong to say the JCHR is 
completely ineffective. It does have some effect, its ability to force the government to publish 
explanatory notes, question ministers and prompt the government to respond to declarations of 
incompatibility shows it does have some impact. Furthermore, our ability to analyse how 
effective it is severally challenged as “much of Parliament’s influence is subtle, largely invisible, 
and frequently even immeasurable.”112 As Hunt and Conor Gearty claimed, the human rights 
literacy of parliamentarians appears to have improved.113 After all, the civil libertarian dilution of 
some legislation must be owed to the Human Rights Act as a “peg upon which parliamentarians 
could hang their arguments.”114
4) Section 10 of the Human Rights Act
Finally one must briefly consider the section 10 fast track remedy process which gives the 
minister the statutory power to take remedial action to amend legislation following a declaration 
                                                          
111 Tomkins ibid (n 23) 35.
112 M Russell and M Benton, 'Assessing the Policy Impact of Parliament: Methodological Challenges and Possible 
Future Approaches' (PSA Legislative Studies Specialist Group Conference, London, 24 June 2009) 1 
<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/parliament/policy-impact/policy_impact_parliament.pdf> 
accessed 05 May 2015.
113 M Hunt, 'The impact of the Human Rights Act on the legislature: a diminution of democracy or a new voice for 
Parliament?' [2010] E.H.R.L.R. 601, 607; and Gearty ibid (n 23) 586.
114 Gearty ibid (n 23) 586.
116
of incompatibility via statutory instrument. Schedule 2 sets out two procedures, a normal route 
and urgent route. Under the normal route, a minister must lay a draft of the order for approval by 
resolution of both Houses of Parliament before remedying.115 In contrast, in urgent cases, the 
order can be placed before Parliament after the legislation has been amended.116 Ministry of 
Justice records show section 10 has been used sparingly. It has been used once following an 
ECHR judgment117 and three times following a domestic declarations.118 It is more common 
practice to use primary legislation to resolve the situation.119
One can assume, section 10 is the preferable route of remedy for the government, as it reduces 
the potential risk of parliamentary scrutiny and time wasting. Remedying legislation via the 
normal route means the government will have to invest political capital and time in its legislative 
programme and open itself to normal criticism. The normal route does allow for a degree of 
parliamentary scrutiny. However, the urgent route does not. Kavanagh has criticised the urgent 
route for allowing the government to take the amendment “totally outside of the parliamentary 
process.”120 Similarly some parliamentarians feel “it is wrong that primary legislation can be 
altered by Statutory Instrument if found incompatible.”121 Remedial measures are subject to 
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scrutiny by the JCHR.122 Nevertheless, as the Equality and Human Rights Commission point out, 
there is a “lack of any evidence to show that the remedial power in section 10 has been in any 
way problematic.”123 One might suggest that section 10 is a less desirable method of remedying 
legislation for proponents of the limiting account. Similar to the way the government encourages
the courts to use section 3 to amend legislation, section 10 reduces Parliament’s role in the 
process. For the enabling account, section 10 reduces the risk of constitutional obstacles for the 
government. 
Nevertheless, one consequence of failing to use section 10 is that it risks a slower response time 
from the political institutions in addressing the incompatibility.  There is evidence the UK has a 
slower response time to the judgments than other countries including those that use a weak form 
review such as Canada.124 This slow response time may further present section 4 as undesirable 
to claimants. Alternatively, slow response times should not be seen as problematic for political 
constitutionalism. They show that the government is not rushing into changing the law. If this 
were the case, post democratic scrutiny would be nothing more than a rubber stamping exercise. 
Although, section 10 is used sparingly, reforming or replacing the Human Rights Act provides a 
good opportunity to remove this provision.125
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Conclusion
The democratic scrutiny side of the Human Rights Act has certainly helped improve democratic 
actors think and consider rights. Perhaps most surprisingly, it has done so in a way that has not 
resulted in a culture of compliance. The government has been able to improve its ability to
consider rights and despite an existing practice of risk aversion, the government has always 
leaned towards a culture of compliance. The government is now more willing to consider rights 
and work to ensure its measures are proportionate, but it has not been willing to let the potential 
risk of legal censure stop it. Furthermore, “the political behaviour in the Commons has not been 
substantially re-oriented” towards a culture of compliance either. 126 Therefore, democratic 
scrutiny under the Human Rights Act is certainly compatible with political constitutionalism, but 
there is more evidence of tension between the two accounts of political constitutionalism. Under 
the Human Rights Act the government’s position appears to be considerably better for the 
enabling account. The Human Rights Act does not present a serious constitutional obstacle to the 
successful delivery of policy in democratic stages. It has improved policy making and rights 
consideration without collapsing into a culture of compliance. In contrast, much to the frustration
of the proponents of the limiting account, although it is compatible, the current practice of the 
House of Commons is that it insufficiently engages in human rights debates. It is more often than 
not that the Commons is all too willing to accept the government’s conclusion or fail to make 
effective use of the JCHR’s reports. As Colin Murray asserts, “Parliament as a whole has to 
shoulder some of the burden of engaging in Human Rights jurisprudence.”127  If the UK is 
engaged in a culture of controversy then the House of Commons appears to be the weakest
institution. 
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Conclusion
The aim of this thesis has been threefold. First, it has sought to contribute to the current debate 
over the future of the Human Rights Act by analysing the UK’s current statutory bill of rights
with the theory of political constitutionalism. I have highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Act according to the theory. Second, this thesis has attempted to identify two main accounts 
of the political constitution; which I have termed “limiting” and “enabling” political 
constitutionalism. There is internal disagreement between these accounts, focused on how to best 
achieve a normative version of political constitutionalism. Finally, building on this, I have sought 
to show how proponents of the limiting and enabling accounts of political constitutionalism 
might perceive elements of the Human Rights Act differently, which in turn shapes how they 
might propose different reforms.
Reflecting on Political Constitutionalism
The first part of this thesis reflected on political constitutionalism by examining its development 
from its seemingly descriptive origins to its modern normative theory. On a closer examination
of the current normative theory, there are at least two different accounts of political 
constitutionalism emerging. Proponents of these accounts have adopted different interpretations 
of the Griffith’s work, republicanism and ordinary political culture. There is a difference in 
emphasis between the two accounts. 
The first account is what I have termed the limiting political constitutionalism. Proponents of this 
account are sceptical of the executive and believe that Parliament serving as a representative of 
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citizens can and should provide effective scrutiny of all executive activity to avoid domination. 
Proponents advocate reducing the government’s control over the Parliament so to enrich political 
debate and ensure the protection of the common good from excessive actions by the government. 
The second account I identified was the enabling political constitutionalism. In contrast to the 
limiting account, the enabling believes the executive is accountable directly to people rather than 
the Commons. They view the executive as vital to ensure the successful promotion and delivery 
of the common good, through a culture of incentivisation which emphasizes the successful 
delivery of electoral promises. Competition between rival aspirants of power to gain and 
maintain a majority promotes political parties to constantly seek new ways of gaining support. 
They also suggest this can yield progressive and inclusive policies. The enabling views the 
government as being directly accountable to the electorate, who should judge it for its ability to 
deliver policy and effectiveness of those policies. This form of accountability rejects 
constitutional obstacles such as constitutional review, entrenched laws or forces within 
Parliament. If these were to prevent the government from delivering the promises it was elected 
on, it would only provide the government with an excuse for the failure to deliver the common 
good, distorting effective accountability.
As a consequence, these two accounts interpret ordinary political activity and in particular the 
relationship between the executive and legislature differently. Therefore, reforms which have 
implications to these institutions may produce disagreement. For example, Adam Tomkins,
who’s works is representative of the limiting account, advocated the removal of party whips 
from Parliament to loosen the executive’s control over the Commons. Danny Nicol, adopting the 
enabling position, strongly disagreed with this idea for reform. 
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The Compatibility of Human Rights Act with Political Constitutionalism
In chapter two, it was identified that under the Human Rights Act, the courts, the government
and Parliament now engage in various forms of rights consideration and scrutiny. This is 
achieved over a four institutional stages. Stages 1 and 2 refer to pre-legislative rights 
consideration by the government and Parliament. Stages 3 and 4 engaged the courts, the 
government and Parliament in post-legislative rights consideration. In the pre-legislative context, 
the government and Parliament must consider the rights implications of legislation. The 
government must do this as a result of their statutory obligations under section 19. Parliament 
can consider rights by scrutinising the government’s section 19 assessments through ordinary 
political debate and the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR). In post legislative context, 
the courts, the government and Parliament may also have to re-consider earlier rights 
assessments. The courts can do this via section 3 and section 4. The government and Parliament 
can do this through section 4, section 10, the JCHR and ordinary political activity. As a result, 
the Human Rights Act has reformed the relationship between all three institutions in the UK. 
Therefore, it was suggested this current system would likely give rise to different views between 
the limiting and enabling accounts.
In regards to the section 3 and section 4 judicial powers, I argued that weak form review had the 
potential of being compatible with political constitutionalism. The crucial consideration is to 
ensure it does not collapse into strong form review. The power to issue a declaration of 
incompatibility under section 4 appears currently more representative of weak form review, thus 
theoretically compatible with both accounts of political constitutionalism. 
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Following a section 4 declaration of incompatibility by a higher court, in the majority of cases 
the government and Parliament reflected on the declaration and then changed the law. In many 
cases, the courts assisted political institutions by highlighting areas of existing legislation that 
affected discrete minorities. The government and Parliament changed the law either accepting 
their own legislation had negative consequences which they had not foreseen, or because they 
disagreed with an earlier government’s legislation. However, in a small minority of cases, either 
the government or Parliament appeared apprehensive or clearly opposed to accepting the 
declaration. Despite this, they ultimately changed the law. On a case by case basis, we can see a 
range of internal and external pressures that resulted in compliance. In some cases, the domestic 
judgment merely mirrored the judgment handed down by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) against the UK, thus the compliances were made to respect the UK obligations under 
International Law. However, in those cases where they disagreed and could have defended their 
position even if the case went to the ECtHR, they did not take the opportunity. Internal pressures 
such as coalition stability, Parliamentary pressure and timing were significant factors in these 
cases. Yet these circumstances have arisen on a case by case basis rather than being the norm. As 
a result, at this stage it is simply too early to determine if a convention is developing that would 
transform section 4 into strong form review. 
Despite these issues, section 4 in practice is more compatible with political constitutionalism 
than section 3. The power to amend legislation through a more radical form of statutory 
interpretation, appears more like strong form review, therefore incompatible with political 
constitutionalism. It has given the courts the power to amend legislation in a way which might 
conflict with the clear intentions of Parliament. There is also a clear lack of democratic oversight 
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of this power. Finally, since section 3 precludes section 4, despite the problems of section 3, it is
the primary judicial power under the current Human Rights Act. This means the potential 
benefits of section 4 is being wasted by relegating it to a  measure of last resort. 
The democratic methods of rights consideration are compatible with political constitutionalism. 
Despite the concerns that they would reduce debate by engulfing all forms of political activity in 
a culture of compliance, the reality is that the Human Rights Act has improved political 
institution’s ability to consider rights without curtailing debate. In this regard, the democratic 
elements have arguably provided stronger evidence which supports the political constitutionalist
faith in democratic institutions. It has done in way which addresses some of the perceived 
shorting comings of the legislative process. The government now considers rights in a more 
robust and detailed way as a result of section 19. However, section 19 has not become a 
constitutional obstacle for the government. Autolimitation has not appeared to have occurred. 
Rather, it has simply resulted in more refined policy consideration. JCHR also helps Parliament 
consider rights in greater detail than before. It is likely that the limiting and enabling accounts
view this democratic rights consideration as a positive, but will have some issues over reforms.
The current model appears to have favoured the government over Parliament. As a result, this
presents some problems for the limiting account. Section 19 has helped foster more refined and 
robust policy making. The government is able to consider rights to a greater extent than before,
allowing them to foresee the rights implications and potential safeguards at the earliest stage. Yet 
this has consequences on Parliament’s role under the Human Rights Act. It can reduce 
Parliament’s ability to contribute. One reason for this is that the government, the majority of the 
124
time, will be seeking to do the minimum necessary to comply with the convention. However, 
Parliament may apply a higher standard. Although, some MP’s and JCHR may disagree with the 
government assessment, they will often struggle to convince the government to change its 
legislation. This is because the government is likely to have already considered these arguments 
and rejected them as unnecessary before introducing the bill before Parliament. Thus, the 
government is more able to reject advice of the JCHR because it has likely to have already 
considered the issue and prepared a response before the bill is introduced. Furthermore, 
amendments might disrupt the government’s plans thus are less likely to be accepted.
Another potential problem is that despite the strong work done by the JCHR, the majority of 
MPs appear unwilling to make better use of JCHR reports. If the JCHR’s recommendations do 
provide a high standard of rights protection and demonstrate what Parliament could achieve then,
some blame must be placed on MPs for their failure to be implemented. Currently, it appears, to
the frustration of proponents of the limiting account, too many MPs are either giving too much 
deference to the government’s assessment or refusing to engage in the human rights debates. 
Reforms
Reforming the judicial and democratic consideration and scrutiny in the Human Rights Act will 
likely give rise to disagreement between the proponents of the limiting and enabling accounts of
political constitutionalism. It is crucial to reform the judicial elements of the current system. 
Section 3 is the most problematic element. Whether a future of bill of rights completely repeals 
or replace it with a reformed version, it is vital that the problems of section 3 are removed to 
ensure a future statutory bill of rights is more compatible with political constitutionalism.
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There is reason to suspect that the enabling account would advocate amending the provision, 
rather than completely repealing it. This is because there is some evidence suggesting that the
provision can favour the government. Counsel for the government frequently advocates that the 
courts use section 3 by recommending their own interpretation to resolve the issue. This allows 
the government to change   the law and still achieve its goals without the risk of negative press or 
further parliamentary hurdles. If section 3 is to be reformed, rather than repealed, the quest here 
is for greater democratic control over judicial activity.1 As it stands, section 3 is poorly drafted, 
there is certainly scope to reform it. Reforms might include re-drafting the provision promoting
greater deference to statute. Section 3 could be amended to “make clear that interpretation cannot 
distort the meaning of statutory language.”2 Another reform could be to give the relevant 
minister the power to approve an interpretation or provide guidance and terms to judges on how 
to proceed. Alternatively, “questions relating to the interpretation of existing legislation be 
referred back to Parliament.”3 This would allow Parliament to then make a decision about how a 
judge should interpret a provision. 
In contrast, the limiting account should advocate the complete repeal of section 3. They should 
believe that courts should only have the power to issue declarations of incompatibility, as it 
allows Parliament to engage in the process. Section 3 can leave re-writes just to the courts and 
the government which is unconstitutional according to the limiting account. With regards to 
1 R Bellamy, 'Political constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act' (2011) 9 ICON 86, 100.
2 J Morgan, ‘Amateur Operatics: The Realization of Parliamentary Protection of Civil Liberties’ in T Campbell, K.D 
Ewing, A Tomkins (eds) The Legal Protection of Human Rights Sceptical Essays (OUP 2011) 442.
3 M Pinto-Duschinsky, ‘Bringing Rights Back Home Making human rights compatible with Parliamentary 
democracy in the UK’ (Policy Exchange, London, 07 February 2011) 61
<http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/bringing%20rights%20back%20home%20-
%20feb%2011.pdf> accessed 05 June 2015.
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section 4, the more the provision is used, the more opportunity there is for democratic actors to 
engage in post-legislative review and perhaps disagree with the courts. Leaving the ECHR could 
also potentially allow for greater decisional and remedial space for democratic actors. However, 
leaving the ECHR will have serious consequences in both domestic and international politics. 
Currently this seems to be an unlikely step for the Conservative government to take. 
Reforming democratic elements is less necessary yet more complicated. The easiest reform to 
make to the democratic stage would be to the fast track remedy system. Although it is rarely 
used, section 10 should be either reformed or complete repealed. Once again, as section 10 
appears to assist the government, the enabling account might advocate reform. Conversely, the 
limiting account would advocate the removal of “this opportunity for ministers to bypass 
Parliament” from a future model.4
Reforming other elements is more complex. Evidence suggests one consequence of the section 
19 statutory requirement is that the government is able to predict and strengthen its arguments in 
the face of Parliamentary disagreement. One might assume the limiting account would wish to 
see section 19 repealed. They might advocate it be replaced with a Parliamentary version of it. 
Instead of being the government’s assessment over the bill’s compliance, it would be 
Parliament’s. However, the only problem is that the practices of greater internal executive 
consideration would continue without the statutory requirement as the process has generally
improved policy making. This might also potentially tip the UK political system into a culture of 
compliance. A more suitable but equally more challenging area of reform the limiting account 
should focus on is getting Parliamentarians to better utilize the JCHR and develop their own 
4 ibid 61.
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voice over rights consideration, rather than simply see rights as the preserve of the governments 
or the courts. This not an easy task, as it will be hard to draw a line at which ordinary political 
debates becomes a culture of compliance. 
Yet it is critical to resolve this issue, as Murray Hunt argues; the more we move away from the 
1998 consensus with each new generation of Parliamentarians, the more urgent it become to get 
Parliamentarians to engage with rights discourse.5 One problem with the current system is that 
the Conservative party has been what Nicol describes as “the epicentre of resistance” to the 
Human Rights Act.6 The “Conservatives in no way assumed the role accorded to opposition 
parties by Alec Stone Sweet” thus avoiding the Commons being engulfed in a culture of 
compliance. Nevertheless, the resistance to the Act, along with the tainting of Human Right Act 
by sections of the press eventually began to infect Labour MPs. This appears to have toxified the 
idea of human rights debates. Instead of MPs engaging in debates over rights and judicial 
decisions, debates have become more focused on the very existence of the Human rights Act.7 A 
Conservative Bill of Rights might encourage both Conservative MPs and the section of the press 
to stop criticizing human rights which might de-toxify the notion of seriously debating rights, in 
doing so potentially allowing for more enriching debates about rights in the commons. 
5 M Hunt, ‘Introduction’ in M Hunt, H Hooper, P Yowell (eds) Parliament and Human Rights: redressing the 
democratic deficit (Hart 2015) 12-13.
6 D Nicol, ‘The Human Rights Act and the politicians’ (2004) 24 LS 451, 472.
7 C.R.G. Murray, ‘The Continuation of Politics, by other means: Judicial Dialogue under the Human Rights Act 
1998’ in R Masterman, I Leigh (eds), The United Kingdom's Statutory Bill of Rights, Constitutional and 
Comparative Perspectives (OUP for the British Academy 2013) 78.
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The Future
In conclusion, Human Rights Act is predominantly compatible with political constitutionalism. 
The democratic stages have helped strengthen the claim that democratic actors are able to 
consider and promote rights in a democratically legitimate way. Section 4 is also compatible and 
allows the courts to assist the political branches. There is area for reform, in particular regarding 
the judicial power under section 3. The potential of replacing the Human Rights Act presents an
opportunity of political constitutionalists to push for reforms that will further refine the UK’s 
rights protection in a way which is more compatible with political constitutionalism. 
However, it may also result in what might be viewed as a regression or a more dramatic shift 
towards legal constitutionalism. Although it is unlikely, a ‘British Bill of Rights’ could somehow 
give more power to the judges over rights, such as a strike down power or retain an unmodified 
section 3 but repeal section 4. The theory of political constitutionalism is in a far more developed 
state to engage in debates about reforming the statutory bill of rights than it was 1997. The 
theory not only has a more developed understanding of its values, but also of statutory bills of 
rights and different judicial powers. As a result, proponents of political constitutionalism are now 
able to better reflect, respond and prompt reforms to a bill of rights. As the UK’s constitution 
continues to evolve and change, it is vital for political constitutionalists to consider the 
implication of potential future reforms like devolution, electoral reform or emerging conventions 
with the theory of political constitutionalism if they wish to continue to see the UK as a 
predominantly political constitution. 
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